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Private Placements to Owner-Managers: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
We present an asymmetric information model to examine private placements issued to
owner-managers. Our main conclusion is that allowing private placements to insiders can mit-
igate, if not eliminate, the underinvestment problem. Our model predicts that announcement
period returns for private placements should be: (1) positive; (2) dependent on regulatory
constraints that determine the issue price; (3) positively related to volatility; (4) negatively
related to leverage; (5) negatively related to owner-managers’ shareholdings (6) inversely re-
lated to proxies of manipulation; and (7) negatively related to illiquidity. We empirically test
our model’s predictions, along with others from literature, on a sample of private placements
issued in the Indian capital markets during 2001-09 and report empirical evidence largely
consistent with the model.
JEL Classification: G 18.
Keywords: Private Placement, Preferential Allotment, Business Groups, Underinvestment
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Private Placements to Owner-Managers: Theory and Evidence
1 Introduction
Significant amounts of capital are raised through private placements of equity around the world.1
Private placements typically occur in the form of block deals issued to firm managers, private
equity players, or banks and other financial institutions. The generally positive market reaction
to announcements of private placement issues of equity (in contrast to the generally negative
reaction to public issues made through conventional secondary equity offerings) suggests that
the market infers a positive signal about firm value when a private placement is announced.
In this paper, we examine the issue of private placements to owner-managers from a theo-
retical as well as an empirical perspective. Our main conclusion from the theoretical analysis is
that allowing private placements to insiders can mitigate, if not eliminate, the underinvestment
problem. The intuition for the above result can be explained with a simple example. Consider a
variation of the classic lemons problem formulated by Akerlof (1970). A car mechanic and her
friend, who is not very knowledgeable about cars, form a 50-50 partnership and buy a car. The
car is operated for hire with the understanding that profits would be equally shared. The car
owners now face an opportunity to upgrade the interior of the car. This upgrade would yield
substantial additional profits in future (and, therefore, increase the resale value of the car to-
day). Should the upgrade be taken up? And how should this investment opportunity be financed?
The interior upgrade is akin to a positive NPV project. Under normal circumstances, either
of the car owners should be willing to finance the upgrade. However, the car mechanic and her
friend may have differing views because they are asymmetrically informed about the quality of
the car. The car mechanic is better informed in that she knows whether the car is a “good” car
or a lemon. Her friend, however, is relatively ignorant about the quality of the car. If the car is
a “good” car, the car mechanic would be more eager to fund the upgrade because her ownership
stake in this “good” car would increase. Her friend, being uninformed, would be less excited
about financing the project.
Now suppose that the car mechanic is unable to finance the upgrade (due to capital con-
straints) or is prohibited from financing the upgrade (due to regulatory constraints). The only
1See Fenn et al. (1997) and Wu (2004), for example.
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recourse for financing the upgrade would be to raise money from the car mechanic’s friend or
to go for third party financing. In either case, financing the upgrade (project) is possible only
if a sufficiently large ownership stake is offered (effectively selling the additional stake at a sub-
stantial discount to its true value). It is likely that such a financing arrangement would not be
approved by the car mechanic because it would dilute her ownership interest in the “good” car.
This deadlock results in underinvestment. One way to resolve this deadlock is to remove any
artificial barriers (such as regulatory constraints) that preclude the car mechanic from financing
the upgrade on her own.
This example illustrates that as long as the manager is not constrained by capital or by
risk aversion, allowing private placements to insiders may potentially solve the underinvestment
problem. Myers and Majluf (1984) and related papers rule out the possibility that managers
can subscribe to their firm’s equity issues. This assumption is reasonable in markets where (lack
of) managerial wealth and managerial risk aversion constrain managers from participating in
equity issues (an exception being management buy-outs). However, in many economies, family-
controlled business groups dominate the economic landscape. In such economies, promoters of
firms often continue to operate them as owner-managers. These promoters usually have access to
other resources, for example through other firms they control, which allows them to participate
in subsequent equity offerings. Our model, therefore, extends our understanding of financing de-
cisions made by managers in many countries, particularly in the emerging economies. However,
the model is not restricted to these markets since the implications of the model are generally
applicable to any market where owner-managers have the choice of issuing equity to themselves,
in the presence of regulatory constraints. By including a third alternative of issuing equity to
owner-managers, in addition to the conventional choice between using internal resources and
seeking outside financing, we generalize the Myers-Majluf (1984) model and show that the un-
derinvestment problem can be mitigated.
The extant literature on private placements suggests several possible motivations for private
placements. First, Wruck (1989) suggests that private placements are used to bring active share-
holders who provide monitoring benefits (Monitoring Hypothesis). Second, Hertzel and Smith
(1993) suggest that placements to private equity players are used as a certification mechanism to
mitigate the information asymmetry problem (Certification Hypothesis). Third, more recently
(Wu (2004), and Barclay et al (2007)), find that private placements are used to bring in pas-
sive shareholders (Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis). Last, (Wu (2004), Baek et al. (2006)
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and Barclay et al (2007)) show that private placements to owner-managers are made at sig-
nificant discounts (Managerial Self-Dealing Hypothesis), which is a variation of the Managerial
Entrenchment Hypothesis. The most recent empirical evidence in the U.S. supports the Manage-
rial Entrenchment and the Managerial Self-dealing Hypotheses. Our work is related to Hertzel
and Smith’s Certification Hypothesis in that it deals with information asymmetry, but it en-
dogenously accounts for managerial self-dealing and the associated market inference regarding
the information asymmetry problem. In general, the hypotheses that emanate from our model
can be classified as part of the broad Undervaluation Hypothesis, as conjectured in Barclay et
al.(2007).2
In order to develop clear and testable empirical implications for Indian capital markets, we
develop a model to reflect the regulatory constraints of the Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), the Indian securities market regulator. The key feature of SEBI’s regulation is
that the issue price in a private placement cannot be lower than the maximum of the most re-
cent market price and the average market price in the previous six months. This rule is clearly
aimed at discouraging managers from “timing” the market and also from “manipulating” stock
prices in order to issue shares to themselves at low prices (managerial self-dealing). Our model
explicitly incorporates this pricing rule as well as the possibility of price manipulation by insiders.
Our model predicts that announcement period returns for private placements should be: (1)
positive; (2) dependent on regulatory constraints that determine the issue price; (3) positively
related to the volatility of prices; (4) negatively related to leverage; (5) negatively related to
the owner-manager’s ownership interest; (6) negatively related to proxies of manipulation; and
(7) negatively related to illiquidity of the stock. We empirically test the model’s predictions on
a sample of 164 private placements issued in the Indian capital markets during 2001-2009 and
report empirical evidence largely consistent with the model. In addition to the empirical pedic-
tion of our model, we also find that: (8) firms affiliated to business groups experience lower but
statistically insignificant announcement period returns compared to stand-alone firms and (9)
private placements made to (active) private equity investors do not experience higher announce-
ment period returns than those made to banks or financial institutions.
2On page 478, Barclay et al. (2007) state, ”This situation, in many ways, is the reverse of Myers and Majluf
(1984). In that analysis, management acting in the interests of all current shareholders issues equity to outsiders
when management believes the stock to be over-valued. In this explanation, managers issue stock to themselves
when they believe their stock to be undervalued.”
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In summary, the contribution of our paper is to extend the Myers and Majluf (1984) frame-
work to examine the financing decisions of firms under information asymmetry. Apart from
developing the model, we are able to test its predictions with data from the Indian securities
market, where owner-managers dominate the capital market and the regulatory environment is
different from that existing in the U.S., the focus of many of the prior studies. Overall, our
empirical evidence corroborates the Myers-Majluf framework after accounting for competing mo-
tivations of private placements.
The paper is organized in five sections. A brief background on the regulation of private
placements in India is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and the
corresponding empirical implications and testable hypotheses that follow from the model. (The
proofs are presented in Appendix 1.) Section 4 describes the data and certain methodological
issues, and also presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Private Placements and Regulatory Restrictions in the Indian Securities
Market
Before developing a model to generate testable empirical implications related to the Underval-
uation Hypothesis, we first discuss the regulatory environment affecting the private placement
market in India. This description is essential background for presenting the salient features of our
theoretical model. The Indian capital market is regulated by SEBI. In India, private placements
of listed companies - often referred to as preferential issues or preferential allotments - are quite
popular. In 2008-2009, Indian firms raised the equivalent of US$7.97 billion through preferential
issues compared to US$6.21 billion, US$ 0.75 billion, and US$ 0.04 billion, through rights offer-
ings, outside equity issues (initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary equity offerings (SEOs)),
and qualified institutional placements (QIPs), respectively.3 It should be emphasized that not
all preferential allotments are made to owner-managers (or promoters, as they are known in local
parlance).4 Preferential allotments are also made to private equity players, banks and financial
3Source: NSE Fact Book 2008-2009. The figures are converted from Indian Rupees INR) to US dollars (USD)
at the exchange rate 1 USD = 45 INR.The popularity of preferential allotments seems to have increased in recent
times after the recent introduction of a grading system for IPOs in India provided by major rating agencies or their
affiliates. This somewhat unusual system of IPO grading was introduced to provide a mechanism for assessing
issuer quality and thereby restricting the entry of fly-by-night operators into the market. Deb and Marisetty
(2009) find that the grading of IPOs has information content only for retail investors; institutional investors do not
appear to make their IPO investment decisions on this basis. Hence, it is likely that issuers who target institutional
investors are better off going for preferential issues, as they eliminate the costs associated with grading and related
expenses incurred in public offerings.
4Shareholders do not enjoy pre-emptive rights in India.
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institutions. However, all preferential allotments are subject to SEBI’s pricing regulations, which
are described below.
2.1 Pricing of Preferential Issues:
The pricing of preferential equity issues in India is governed by the following regulations with
the relevant phrases italicized:5 “The issue of shares on a preferential basis (equity shares/ fully
convertible debentures/ partly convertible debentures) can be made at a price not less than the
higher of the following: (a) The average of the weekly high and low of the closing prices of the
related shares quoted on the stock exchange during the six month period preceding the relevant
date; or (b) The average of the weekly high and low of the closing price of the related shares
quoted on a stock exchange during the two week period preceding the relevant date.” The rel-
evant date for this purpose is the date 30 days prior to the date on which the meeting of the
general body of shareholders is held.
The above figure depicts an example of the preferential allotments of two firms, namely Reliance Infra Limited
and HEG Limited. The figure has number of trading days before the relevant date (date 0) on the X -axis and
the corresponding daily prices for those days on the Y -axis. As per SEBI regulations, the issue price should be
the higher of either the two week average of the weekly High-Low prices or the six months average of the weekly
High-Low prices prior to the relevant date. The relevant date is itself 30 days (or 22 trading days) prior to the
date of the Extraordinary General Meeting of shareholders to approve the issue. Hence for Reliance Infra, the
SEBI-mandated issue price is the two week average weekly High-Low price, whereas, for HEG, the SEBI-mandated
issue price is the six month average weekly High-Low price.
Figure 1 illustrates the SEBI pricing rule. For purposes of illustration, the price histories of
two firms, Reliance Infra and HEG, are displayed on the graph. For Reliance Infra, prices had
been increasing. Thus, the average price in the two week period prior to the relevant date is
greater than the average price in the six-month period prior to the relevant date. SEBI rules
force the firm to issue at a price greater than (or equal to) the higher of these two prices, namely,
the average price in the two-week period prior to the relevant date.
Exactly the converse situation arises for HEG, whose prices had been generally declining.
SEBI pricing rules imply that the issue price should exceed the average price in the six-month
period prior to the relevant date. In general, if prices are declining, the (lower bound on the)
5SEBI Disclosure and Investor Protection Guidelines, 2000, updated 2009
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Figure 1: SEBI regulations on the issue price in a preferential allotment
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issue price is determined by the historical average price, and if prices are increasing, the (lower
bound on the) issue price is determined by more recent period valuation. This arrangement
ostensibly protects minority shareholders from managerial self-dealing.6
3 Model and Testable Implications
We now present a variation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model to analyze private placements.
In this economy, firms are managed by an individual shareholder or a subset of shareholders (we
6In addition to pricing restrictions, there is also a “lock-in” period of three years from the date of allotment.
This rule prevents “flipping” by preferential allottees for short term gains based on privileged information. SEBI’s
norms require the issuer to provide the following information to the stock exchange: (i) The objective of the
preferential allotment, (ii) The intention of the promoters and other related parties to subscribe for the offer, (iii)
The share holding pattern before and after the offer, (iv) The proposed time within which the allotment will be
completed, and (v) The identification of the proposed allottees and the percentage of post-preferential issue capital
that may be held by each of the promoters. These disclosures are meant to provide transparency regarding the
use of the proceeds of the issue as well as the process of allotment of the issue to investors.
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refer to these investors as owner-managers). Consider a firm that faces a positive NPV invest-
ment opportunity. The firm does not have enough resources to fund this project internally - it
has to be funded with external capital. It can raise capital either in the form of an equity issue to
outsiders (we refer to this as outside equity or “OE”) or in the form of a private placement to the
owner-managers or associates (we refer to this alternative as a preferential allotment or “PA”).7,8
The firm also has the choice of rejecting the positive NPV project, thereby underinvesting (we
refer to this situation as “NI” or “No Issue”). Similar to the Myers and Majluf setup, we consider
equity capital as a new financing choice, on the assumption that the capital structure choice has
already been made.9
There are three dates in our model: τ= -1, 0 and +1. Firm value consists of three compo-
nents: value due to assets-in-place (AIP), hidden value (HV), which characterizes the asymmetric
information about assets-in-place, and value due to a positive NPV investment opportunity (IO),
about which there is no information asymmetry.
The payoffs on the three components of the firm value are uncertain at date τ= -1, but
realizations of all these payoffs occur on the liquidation date τ= +1. To keep the model simple
and intuitive, we consider a two-state economy (with equal probabilities in each state). Thus,
all payoffs arise in a binary form. Further, we assume risk-neutral participants and normalize
the risk free rate to 0 without loss of generality. Figure 2 provides an overview of the model
structure, which is described in detail below.
3.1 Assets-in-Place (AIP):
At date τ = -1, the market views the firm as consisting of assets-in-place, whose terminal
(date τ = +1) payoff is of the form {s, 0} with equal probability. The up-state payoff s is itself
a random variable; at date τ = -1, the market believes that s can either be h (for “high”) or l
7Private placements to owner-managers differ from rights issues, which are offered to all shareholders on a
pro-rata basis. In terms of modeling, a rights issue is a hybrid between a private placement and an outside equity
issue because some existing shareholders (owner-managers) are informed while the remaining shareholders are
uninformed (as would be the case for outside equity participants). In Appendix A.1.8, we explicitly consider rights
offerings, “RO” as a third financing alternative. We discuss the implications of this additional choice later on in
this section and show that our main conclusions regarding private placements continue to obtain even when rights
offerings are an alternative.
8The special case of private placements made to outsiders is discussed later on in the paper, after we develop
the basic model.
9Later on in the paper, we discuss the effect of the current leverage of the firm on the choice among the three
alternatives.
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(for “low”) with equal probability. At date τ = 0−, the market learns whether s is h or l with
certainty and updates its assessment of assets-in-place to either {h, 0} or {l, 0} depending on
the realization of s. It should be emphasized that there is no information asymmetry between
the owner-managers and the market regarding any of these parameters describing the assets-in-
place. This characterization of the evolution in the value of assets-in-place allows us to capture the
essence of SEBI’s regulatory framework with regard to the issue price of a preferential allotment
in a stylized manner. Henceforth, we will refer to the price path dynamics as being under a “high
price path” (when s = h) or under a “low price path” (when s = l).
3.2 Hidden Value (HV):
The market believes that there could be hidden value (or lack of it) in the firm, in addition
to the value of the assets-in-place. Hidden value takes the form of outcomes {t, 0} with equal
probability, where t itself is a random variable that is uniformly distributed over the range
{-H, H}. Thus, hidden value can be favorable news or unfavorable news. The random variable
t captures asymmetric information in the context of the model, in a simple fashion. Both the
market and the owner-managers are equally uninformed about the value of t at date τ = -1,
and hence, there is no information asymmetry on that date. At date τ = 0−, owner-managers
privately observe a private signal of t, which helps them take a call on their investment-financing
decision.
3.3 Investment Opportunity (IO):
At date τ = -1, the market is aware of a positive NPV investment opportunity that the firm
possesses. This investment opportunity requires an investment of I and yields cash flows CF =
{x, y}, at date τ = +1 with equal probability. Both the market and the owner-managers are
symmetrically informed about the nature of payoffs on the investment opportunity. Since the
project has a positive NPV, it implies that I < 12(x+ y).
It is important to clarify our modeling choices about the structure of information. First, one
could model the value of assets-in-place (AIP ) as simply s instead of a binary variable (s, 0).
In similar vein, we could also have defined hidden value (HV ) as t instead of a binary variable
(t, 0) and the cash flows from the project as a non-random quantity instead of a binary variable,
(x, y). Our information structure is only slightly more complex than the minimum required, but
it gives the realistic flavor of postponing uncertainty resolution till the terminal date.
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Second, on the terminal date τ = 1, the worst realization of t is −H and the worst possible
realization of the value of the assets-in-place (AIP ) is 0. If the firm chooses not to invest in
the positive NPV investment opportunity, this worst case scenario could result in negative asset
prices. We ensure positive prices in the economy by assuming that the value of assets-in-place
consists of a certain part and an uncertain part (given by s, 0). The certain part is assumed to
be sufficiently high to preclude the possibility of negative asset values.10
At date τ = 0−, the market sees the realization of s and then owner-managers observe a
private signal (t) about the hidden value (HV ). The main objective of the model is to capture
the investment-financing decision of owner-managers. Owner-managers can choose among the
following alternatives: (i) issue equity to outsiders (OE) and invest in the positive NPV oppor-
tunity, or (ii) issue equity to themselves, using the preferential allotment mechanism (PA) and
invest in the positive NPV opportunity, or (iii) reject the project and underinvest (NI).11
The time-line of the information revelation and the choices available are summarized below
in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Schematic Description of the model
Hidden Value (HV): {t,0}≡ U{-H,H}
Assets in Place (AIP):{s,0},s ≡ {l,h}
Investment Opportunity(IO):(−I,CF),CF≡ {x, y}
Asymmetry of Information between
Owners managers and outsiders
Manager knows t at τ = 0−None
s is realized at τ = 0− Managerial Response at τ = 0+
LIQ
U
ID
ATIO
N
None
Preferential Allotment(PA)
No Issue(NI)
Outside Equity(OE)
Preferential Allotment(PA)
(NI)No Issue
Outside Equity(OE)
HV: {t,0},t≡U(-H,H)
AIP: {h,0}
IO:{-l,CF},CF ≡{x,y}
HV: {t,0},t ≡ U(-H,H)
AIP: {l,0}
IO:{-I,CF},CF ≡{x,y}
s=h
s=l
t≡U(-H,H)
s≡{l,h}
N/A
τ = −1 τ = 0− τ = 0 τ = 0+ τ = +1
3.4 Summary of key assumptions:
10Without loss of generality, we set this certain part to be equal to 0 for convenience.
11In Appendix A.1.8, we extend the model to include the alternative of making a rights offering to the present
shareholders.
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We summarize the main assumptions made in the model:
1. Firm value consists of value due to asset-in-place (AIP ), which consists of a certain part
normalized to 0 and an uncertain part, which is described by a equally probable binary
variable (s, 0), and hidden value (HV ), which is described by an equally probably binary
value (t, 0). Owner-managers face a positive NPV investment opportunity, which requires
an investment I and throws up cash flows described by an equally probably binary variable
(x, y). Firms are allowed to raise equity in the form of public issues or preferential allotments
to themselves.
2. The issue price in a preferential allotment to insiders is subject to regulatory constraints
- in essence, preferential allotments to insiders can be made at a price no less than the
maximum of the most recent firm value or the average firm value during the previous
period (similar to the SEBI regulations).
3. Owner-managers own a fraction α of the firm and maximize the liquidation value of their
total holdings (as on date τ = +1).
4. There is information asymmetry only about the existing assets of the firm, but not about
the positive NPV investment opportunity. Owner-managers observe a private signal (t),
which determines the hidden value associated with the existing assets of the firm.
5. Debt financing is ruled out.
6. The firm has no financial slack and the entire investment in the positive NPV project has
to be raised through equity financing. Due to regulatory restrictions, the firm cannot issue
issue stock in excess of the investment in the project.
7. All participants in this economy are risk-neutral. The risk free rate is normalized to 0
without loss of generality.
8. There are no taxes and transaction costs in the model.
9. There are no agency problems among owner-managers.
Assumption # 1 and # 2 describe the nature of the problem being examined in this model.
Assumption # 3 is consistent with the assumption in Wu and Wang (2005), but different from
the original Myers and Majluf (1984) model, where managers maximize the weighted average of
current and future share value of the firm. The only critical assumption in the above depiction
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of the model is Assumption # 4, which states that there is information asymmetry only about
existing assets, but not about the investment opportunity. Employing this simpler set-up allows
us to focus on the key implications of this model with much greater insight into the factors that
drive the results of the model. This assumption is relaxed in Appendix 1, where information
asymmetry exists about both existing assets and the NPV of the project. We show that the
results developed in this section continue to hold in the more general setup. Assumptions # 5-9
are purely for convenience in establishing the results and the model is robust to the relaxations
of these assumptions. Assumption #6 is made partly for convenience, but also to stay within
the spirit of regulatory constraints on preferential allotments.
Before proceeding further, note that firm value at each point of time depends on the infor-
mation available to the market at that point of time. Let V0−(s) denote the pre-announcement
(date τ = 0−) market value of the firm. This value will be given by the sum of the market
value of the assets-in-place (AIP), the market expectations of the hidden value (HV ) and the
NPV of the investment opportunity (IO), which is equal to x+y2 − I. On this date, the market’s
expectation of the hidden value (HV ) is zero.12 Furthermore, at date τ = 0−, the expected
value of assets-in-place (AIP) is equal to s/2. It follows that V0−(s = h) =
h
2 +
x+y
2 − I and
V0−(s = l) =
l
2 +
x+y
2 − I, and in general, V0−(s) =
s
2 +
x+y
2 − I. If V−1 denotes the market
value at time τ = −1, then V−1 = V0−(s = h)
1
2 + V0−(s = l)
1
2 =
h+l
4 +
x+y
2 − I. Note that
V0−(s = h) > V−1 > V0−(s = l).
SEBI pricing rules imply that the issue price in a preferential allotment should be at least
as high as the higher of the historical average of past prices and the current (most recent) price
levels at the time of the preferential allotment. Starting from date τ = -1, prices can either go
up (s = h) or down (s = l). On the high price path, the historical average price would be lower
than current price whereas on the low price path, the historical average price would be greater
than the current price. Thus, on the high price path, SEBI regulations imply that the issue price
has to be greater than the current price. Conversely, on the low price path, SEBI regulations
imply that the issue price has to be greater than the historical average price. This means that
owner-managers who buy shares in a preferential allotment pay an additional premium over and
above the current market value when s = l. The following proposition and corollary describes
12It is shown in Appendix A.1.1 that this claim holds true in equilibrium after accounting for the financing
and investment decision of owner-managers. Appendix A.1.8 shows that the market’s expectation of hidden value
(HV ) is zero, even in the extended model, where rights offerings, RO, are an additional choice.
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the owner-managers’ decision making criteria at date τ = 0.
Proposition 1. If the investment opportunity is such that its NPV ≥ NPV (s), (s = l, h),
there is no underinvestment in the economy. The owner-managers’ investment-financing deci-
sion can be summarized by three threshold levels or cut-off values for the value of the private
signal observed by owner-managers (t). The cut-off, t̂NI−PA(s), denotes the cut-off level of t
below which the owner-managers prefer to forgo the investment opportunity (the underinvest-
ment alternative denoted as NI) and above which they prefer to go for a preferential allotment
(PA). In a similar vein, t̂OE−NI(s) and t̂OE−PA(s) denote the cut-off levels that determine the
choice between outside equity and underinvestment and between outside equity and preferential
allotment, respectively. The threshold cutoffs for the NPV of the investment opportunity and the
value of the private signal (t) are given below:
NPV (s) =
(1− α) (h−s)4 (
x+y
2 )
s+ x+ y + (h−s)4
, s = l, h (1)
t̂NI−PA(s) =
[
s+ x+ y +
1
4
(h− s)
][
I − αx+y2
I(1− α)
]
− (s+ x+ y) < 0, s = l, h (2)
t̂OE−PA(s) =
(s+ x+ y)(1− α) (h−s)4
(s+ x+ y) + α4 (h− s)
≥ 0, s = l, h (3)
t̂OE−NI(s) = [(s+ x+ y)]
[
(x+y)
2
I
− 1
]
> 0, s = l, h (4)
where,
NPV (s) >= 0, t̂OE−NI(s) > t̂OE−PA(s) ≥ 0 > t̂NI−PA(s), s = l, h
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The owner-managers’ financing choice depends on the private signal of t that they privately
observe at τ= 0−. The threshold cutoffs, t̂NI−PA(s), t̂OE−PA(s), and t̂OE−NI(s), carve out re-
gions in the value of t that determine the (pairwise) preference ordering among the three alterna-
tives: equity financing (OE), underinvestment (NI) and preferential allotment (PA). For instance,
the threshold cutoff, t̂OE−NI(s), denotes the cutoff value of t such that for all t <= t̂OE−NI(s),
owner-managers would prefer the outside equity alternative (OE), and for all t > t̂OE−NI(s),
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owner-managers would prefer to forgo the project (NI).
Figure 3 shows the different regions of t corresponding to the various financing choices. It
can be seen that the preferential allotment alternative (PA) dominates for higher values of t,
whereas the outside equity alternative (OE) dominates for lower values of t. In fact, upon
careful inspection of Figure 3, it becomes obvious that the critical threshold is the OE-PA cutoff,
t̂OE−PA(s). The other two threshold cutoffs are irrelevant. So long as owner-managers observe
a signal of t greater than t̂OE−PA(s), they would always opt for a preferential allotment (PA).
In contrast, for any signal of t less than t̂OE−PA(s), they would always opt for an outside equity
issue (OE). Note that the NI alternative is always dominated either by PA or OE. As can be
seen in Figure 3, there is no underinvestment in this economy!13,14
Figure 3: Schematic Representation of the Managerial Choice of Financing.
Outside Equity(OE) Preferential Allotment(PA)
OE  PA  NI PA  OE  NI PA  NI  OEOE  NI  PA
-H +H
t̂OE-NI(s)t̂OE-PA(s)t̂NI-PA(s)
Proposition 1 states that if s = h, i.e., the price path dynamics is along the “high price path”,
t̂OE−PA(s) = 0. This implies that owner-managers issue equity to outsiders only if they observe
a negative signal (t < 0); otherwise they issue equity to themselves through the preferential al-
lotment mechanism (if t > 0). Furthermore, note that the NPV cutoff value (NPV (s), as stated
in Proposition 1) is exactly equal to 0, when s = h. This implies that, under Proposition 1, for
the high price path (s = h), the firm accepts all positive NPV projects: when the signal, t, is
positive, owner-managers finance the project and when the signal, t, is negative, outside equity is
13In Appendix A.1.8, we include rights offerings, RO, as an additional alternative. We show that Proposition
1 is modifed with a region, t ∈ (0, h−s
4
), where RO is the optimal choice, and another region, t > h−s
4
, where
preferential allotment, PA, dominates the other alternatives.
14The lower bound on the NPV of the project becomes zero, when a rights offering, RO, is included as a choice,
as shown in Appendix A.1.8.
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used to finance the projects. This situation corresponds to the classic Myers and Majluf (1984)
world, if insiders were allowed to finance the project. Thus, underinvestment would be eliminated
and all positive NPV projects would be accepted, in line with the intuition of the example in the
introduction.
In contrast, when s = l, i.e., the price path dynamics follows the “low price path”, t̂OE−PA(s)
is strictly greater than 0. Owner-managers would now always accept the project (i.e., there is
no underinvestment) only if it has sufficiently positive NPV (NPV (s), as stated in Proposition
1); furthermore, owner-managers finance the project only if the signal, t, is sufficiently positive;
otherwise, outside equity is used to finance the project. This situation implies that in the s
= l case, if the project does not have a sufficiently positive NPV, it may be rejected for some
positive values of the signal, t. In other words, underinvestment can be mitigated but cannot be
eliminated when s = l.
The reason for this asymmetric decision making by owner-managers with regard to the real-
ization of s is a result of the regulatory constraint on the issue price in a preferential allotment.
SEBI regulations state that the issue price should be greater than the maximum of the most
recent valuation and the average valuation over the previous six month period. When s = h,
i.e., when the assets-in-place follow the high price path, SEBI regulations require the preferential
issue to be priced at least as high as the most recent valuation (i.e, the issue can be “fairly
priced”). On the other hand, when the stock price goes along the low price path, i.e., s = l, the
preferential issue is priced at the historical average valuation, which, by construction, is always
greater than the most recent valuation because prices are declining along the “low price path”.
As a result, in the s = l case, owner-managers (as buyers in the preferential allotment) pay a
premium over and above the most recent market value of the security. This additional payment
causes owner-managers to adopt a more conservative investment and financing policy: (i) under-
investment is avoided only if the project NPV is above a cutoff value, and (ii) the preferential
allotment alternative is chosen only for sufficiently positive signals of t above a strictly positive
threshold cutoff value.
To see the intuition behind these results, it is useful to examine the s = l case in terms of the
opportunity gains (costs) faced by owner-managers when opting for each of the three alternatives:
OE, PA, and NI. First, if owner-managers forgo the project (NI alternative), their opportunity
loss would be −αNPV = −α(x+y2 − I), after noting that owner-managers hold a fraction α of
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the firm. Now consider the OE alternative. In this case, owner-managers face dilution whenever
they observe a good signal of hidden value (i.e, when t > 0) because the issue price would reflect
a lower firm value than the value based on their private information about the hidden value.
Note that the firm value would be understated by an amount equal to t2 , given that hidden value
takes the form of t in the good state and 0 in the bad state (the probability of each state is 12).
If the fraction of the firm sold in the outside equity issue is fOE(s = l), original shareholders, as
a group, face a dilution loss of −fOE(s = l) t2 . The opportunity loss of owner-managers is given
by −αfOE(s = l) t2 , where α is the proportionate owner-managers’ shareholding. Note that this
opportunity loss transforms into an opportunity gain for owner-managers when t is negative, and
owner-managers would not mind opting for outside equity for negative signals of t.
Finally, let us consider the preferential allotment alternative, when s = l. This case is slightly
more complicated because owner-managers play a dual role - as buyers in the preferential al-
lotment and as (part) owners selling a stake in the firm. Whatever owner-managers gain (lose)
as new buyers would appear as losses (gains) in their other role as existing owners. To see
this, recognize that owner-managers (as buyers) would pay an additional premium due to SEBI
regulatory constraints, which require the firm to issue shares at the higher historical average
price than the most recent market price of the firm. This difference can be shown to be equal
to (h−l)8 (see Equation 10, Appendix 1). If the fraction of shares issued in the preferential al-
lotment is fPA(s = l), then the opportunity loss due to this additional premium is given by
−fPA(s = l) (h−l)8 .
In addition, owner-managers (as buyers) face an opportunity gain when t > 0 because they
buy undervalued shares. This opportunity gain is given by fPA(s = l) t2 . The net gain (loss) of
owner-managers in their role as buyers is equal to fPA(s = l)[ t2−
(h−l)
8 ]. Assume that buyers make
a net gain. Now consider the role of owner-managers as owners. First, the owners as a group lose
whatever the buyers gain. Thus, the owners as a group would lose fPA(s = l)[ t2−
(h−l)
8 ]. However,
because owner-managers only hold a fraction α of the firm, they will face only a fraction of α of
these costs in their role as owner-managers. Now consider the overall effect on owner managers:
as buyers they gain fPA(s = l)[ t2−
(h−l)
8 ] but as owner-managers they lose αf
PA(s = l)[ t2−
(h−l)
8 ].
The net effect is an opportunity gain (loss, if negative) of (1 − α)fPA(s = l)[ t2 −
(h−l)
8 ]. Note
that the preferential allotment alternative imposes a reverse dilution effect on owner-managers.
An opportunity gain occurs when t is positive and an opportunity loss when t is negative.
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Figure 4: Opportunity Gains (Costs) of Owner-Managers under the Outside Equity(OE),
Preferential Allotment(PA), and No Investment (NA) Alternatives: No
Underinvestment Case.
Additional Premium due
to SEBI Regulations
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)
t̂OE−PA(s = h)
Opportunity Gains(Costs)
t (Hidden Value)
No Investment(NI)
Outside Equity (OE), s=l,h
Preferential Allotment (PA), s=h
Preferential Allotment (PA), s=l
Opportunity Cost = (1− α)fPA(s = h) t
2
Opportunity Cost = (1− α)fPA(s = l)[− (h−l)
8
+ t
2
]
t̂OE−PA(s = l)
Opportunity Cost = −αfOE(s = l) t
2
Opportunity Cost = −αNPV
The opportunity gains (costs) lines under the three alternatives (NI, OE, and PA) are shown in
Figure 4 as a function of the private signal of t observed by owner-managers. The NI alternative
is independent of t, the OE alternative is a declining linear function of t, and the PA alternative
is an increasing linear function of t. First, note that there is a single opportunity gains (costs) line
associated with the OE alternative, but there are two opportunity gains (costs) lines associated
with the PA alternative. This situation arises because SEBI pricing regulations, which apply
only in the PA alternative, impose different restrictions on the issue price in the s = h case and
the s = l case. The s = l opportunity gains (costs) line in the PA alternative reflects a downward
shift (relative to the s = h opportunity cost line) due to the additional premium imposed by
SEBI regulations. This can be seen in the y-intercept of the s = l line. It is equal to − (h−l)8 ,
the difference in the historical average price and the most recent price. Since, this additional
premium is absent in the s = h case, the PA alternative for the s = h case goes through the origin.
Now consider the s = h case. It can be seen from Figure 4 that the OE and PA(s = h)
opportunity cost lines intersect exactly at the origin. Note also that the opportunity gains (costs)
line of the NI alternative lies completely below the origin. It is easy to note that NI alternative
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will never be preferred. For any private signal t < 0, owner-managers would prefer the OE alter-
native, and for any private signal t > 0, owner-managers would prefer the PA(s = h) alternative.
The V-shaped contour that follows the OE opportunity cost line for all values of t below 0 and
the PA(s = h) opportunity cost line for all values of t greater than 0 describes the equilibrium
investment-financing decision of owner-managers when s = h. For no value of t would the NI
alternative be considered worthwhile since the opportunity costs (gains) under other alternatives
would be strictly lower (higher). In other words, there will no underinvestment in the economy,
in line with the intuition of the example in the introduction. The critical value of t when the
owner-manager switches from the OE alternative to the PA alternative is 0, which is the same
as the value of t̂OE−PA(s = h) = 0, discussed in Proposition 1. It can be seen that the s = h
case is simply the Myers-Majluf world where owner-managers face no capital constraints and are
allowed to finance projects by investing in the firms’s equity at the prevailing market price.
In the s = l case, SEBI regulations affect the equilibrium outcomes. Now the PA alternative
shifts downwards, and as can be seen in the figure, the intersection point of the OE and PA al-
ternatives shifts to the right. Furthermore, since the intersection point lies above the opportunity
gains (costs) line for the NI alternative for all value of t, the NI alternative is again irrelevant
(i.e., there will never be any underinvestment). The optimal investment-financing decision of
owner-managers is similar to s = h case, except that the relevant t value shifts from the origin
to the right. The new critical cutoff value of t is now given by the x -intercept of the intersection
point between the OE and PA alternatives. To the left of this cutoff value, the opportunity
gains (costs) under the OE alternative dominate the other alternatives, but to the right of this
cutoff value, the opportunity gains (costs) under the PA alternative are superior to the other
alternatives. In other words, owner-managers use a more conservative cutoff when opting for a
preferential allotment in the s = l case. The V-shaped darkened line represents the opportunity
gains (costs) associated with the optimal investment-financing decision of owner-managers for
different values of the signal of private information (t). Furthermore, upon equating the oppor-
tunity costs under the OE alternative and the PA alternative, one can show that the x -intercept
of the intersection point is the same as t̂OE−PA(s = l), as stated on Proposition 1. Thus, to the
left (right) of t̂OE−PA(s = l), the OE (PA) alternative dominates. Owner-managers use a more
conservative cutoff when opting for a preferential allotment in the s = l case.
To see the role of the NPV cutoff condition in Proposition 1, note that if the intersection
point of the OE and PA opportunity gains (costs) lines lies below (as opposed to above) the
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opportunity cost line representing the NI alternative, there could be values of t for which owner
managers would prefer to forgo the project. This can be seen in Figure 5 where the locus of the
optimal financing alternatives is shown as a dark line. Such a situation is likely to happen when
the additional premium imposed due to SEBI regulatory constraints is large in relation to the
owner-managers’ share of the NPV of the project. An increase in the additional premium pushes
the opportunity cost line of the PA alternative further downwards. At the same time, a decrease
in the NPV of the project pushes the opportunity cost of the NI alternative upward. Thus, the
relative magnitude of the additional premium as compared to the owner-managers’ shareholding
(α) times the NPV of the project determines whether the intersection point of the OE and the
PA alternatives lies above or below the opportunity cost line of the NI alternative. In Figure 4,
the intersection point is above the opportunity cost line of the NI alternative. This implies that
there would be no underinvestment in the economy. For the case where the intersection point
lies below the NI opportunity cost line, as depicted in Figure 5, it is easy to see that there is
an intermediate range of t values around t̂OE−PA(s) where the owner-managers would prefer the
underinvestment alternative (NI). However, for relatively low (high) values of t, the OE (PA)
alternative would be preferred. Thus, if α times the NPV of the project is not sufficiently high
relative to the additional premium caused by SEBI regulations, underinvestment may occur for
certain values of t.
The y-value of the intersection point depends on the additional premium paid by owner-
managers when a preferential allotment is made in the s = l situation. By equating the y-value
of the intersection point with the constant opportunity cost under the NI alternative, one can
back out the critical NPV cutoff that will trigger some underinvestment. This lower bound of
the NPV is NPV (s), the same as stated in Proposition 1.15
To summarize, the underinvestment situation that arises in the Myers and Majluf (1984)
world is eliminated (for sufficiently positive NPV projects) when preferential allotment to in-
siders is allowed.16 The overall intuition behind this result is as follows. When insiders see
15Upon examination of the NPV cutoff condition in Proposition 1, it can be seen that the cutoff, NPV (s), is
increasing in h − l, a measure of the volatility in assets-in-place, and (x+y)
2
, a measure of the cash flows (project
size), but decreasing in α, the owner-managers’ shareholding. Since underinvestment is more likely when the NPV
condition is violated, the model suggests that underinvestment is more likely for large projects in the case of firms
operating in risky businesses, particularly and with small owner-manager stakes.
16If the project has a negative NPV, our model implies that for extremely good (bad) news about the hidden
value, preferential allotments (outside equity) are used. Thus, overinvestment would occur. For intermediate
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Figure 5: Opportunity Gains (Costs) of Owner-Managers under the Outside Equity(OE),
Preferential Allotment(PA), and No Investment (NA) Alternatives:
Underinvestment Case.
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to SEBI Regulations
(
h−l
8
)
t̂OE−PA(s = h)
Opportunity Gains(Costs)
t (Hidden Value)
No Investment(NI)
Outside Equity (OE), s=l,h
Preferential Allotment (PA), s=h
Preferential Allotment (PA), s=l
Opportunity Cost = (1− α)fPA(s = h) t
2
Opportunity Cost = (1− α)fPA(s = l)[− (h−l)
8
+ t
2
]
t̂OE−PA(s = l)
Opportunity Cost = −αfOE(s = 1) t
2
Opportunity Cost = −αNPV
“good” information, they are reluctant to issue equity to outsiders due to the dilution of original
shareholder’s wealth, because of the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. In
our model, subject to the NPV cutoff condition, the information asymmetry-driven “dilution”
problem does not generally arise. The information asymmetry is completely resolved because
shares would be issued to informed insiders whenever the information is “good”. When the
information is “bad”, shares would be issued to outsiders, who are always willing to buy them
because they are issued at fair value (SEBI regulations apply only to preferential allotments).
(Of course, they may be interested in selling even more equity than the requirement of funds for
realizations of the hidden value, the project is not taken up (underinvestment). This fact can be easily verified in
graphical terms by considering a negative NPV project in Figure 5. The opportunity cost of the NI alternative
would now lie above (and parallel) to the x -axis. The optimal financing plan will be similar to that shown in Figure
5, except that the underinvestment range will increase. Interestingly, one can see that preferential allotments would
still be socially beneficial because they arise only when the good news about hidden value more than offsets the
bad news implicit in the negative NPV project. Therefore, the information content of a preferential allotment is
positive even when the project has a negative NPV. For extremely adverse news about hidden value, the negative
NPV project may still be taken up with outside equity financing. Outsiders are never averse to subscribing to
an equity issue because the issue price is always “fair,” conditional on their information set. This would result
in socially sub-optimal overinvestment. Finally, there would be a positive reaction to underinvestment because
the pre-announcement price reflects the negative NPV investment opportunity. The general case of negative NPV
investment opportunities is discussed in detail in Cooney and Kalay (1993).
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the project, which is not permitted by assumption.) Finally, the strong “no underinvestemnt”
result is weakened when the NPV of the investment opportunity is low relative to the additional
premium on the issue price imposed by SEBI rules. Owner-managers have less to forgo when
the NPV of the investment opportunity is low and may prefer to underinvest when their private
information about the hidden value is marginally positive.17
The special case where private placements can be made to private equity players has not
been explicitly considered in this model. If private equity players are uninformed, they are no
different from outside equity holders in our model. There would be no need to consider them
separately. However, if private equity players are informed participants (for instance, if they can
either acquire information by incurring a cost or if they are partially informed about t), the model
can be extended to consider this possibility. Given that the private equity player either faces
costs of information acquisition or observes only partial information, she would require an even
higher threshold value of t to participate in a preferential allotment (because she is also subject
to SEBI’s regulatory pricing restrictions). In other words, it would never be the case that the
private equity preferential allotment will replace a preferential allotment to owner-managers. In
equilibrium, there will be no preferential allotments made to private equity players. But, if owner-
managers are capital-constrained, the choice narrows to one between outside equity financing to
the public or the private equity player, if the project is to be undertaken. It is obvious that
as long as owner-managers do not observe too high a value of t (that would trigger significant
dilution when shares are sold to outsiders), they would prefer issuing shares to a private equity
player rather than going for a public issue, because the private equity player would be willing to
pay more than the uninformed outsiders. This conclusion is similar to what Hertzel and Smith
(1993) find from their empirical analysis based on the Myers and Majluf (1984) model.
We next explore the comparative statics properties of the critical threshold t̂OE−PA(s), which
determines the cutoff between OE and PA in our model.
Corollary 1.
i. The critical threshold cutoff, t̂OE−PA(s) has the following properties:
t̂OE−PA(s = h) < t̂OE−PA(s = l),
∂t̂OE−PA(s = l)
∂(h − l)
> 0,
∂t̂OE−PA(s = l)
∂α
< 0 (5)
17The opportunity gains (costs) when a rights offering, RO is included as one of the choices (in addition to NI ,
OE, and NI), are analyzed in Appendix A.1.8. We illustrate the conclusion that PA is the optimal choice in the
region where t ∈ (0, h−s
4
) in the graphical analysis of the extension of Proposition 1.
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ii. The announcement period reaction, ∆P (s), is greater than 0.
∆P (s) =
[t̂OE−PA(s) +H]
4
=
1
16
[(s+ x+ y)(1− α)(h − s)][
(s+ x+ y) + α4 (h− s)
] + H
4
> 0, s = l, h (6)
iii. The announcement period return is inversely related to the price path dynamics (s = l, h)
and the degree of information asymmetry about the hidden value (t), as measured by H.
Conditional on s = l, announcement period returns are positively related to the degree
of uncertainty in the value of assets-in-place, (h − l), but inversely related to the owner-
managers’ shareholding (α).
∆P (s = h) < ∆P (s = l),
∂∆P (s)
∂H
> 0,
∂∆P (s = l)
∂(h− l)
> 0,
∂∆P (s = l)
∂α
< 0 (7)
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Corollary 1 (i) presents a few properties of the critical threshold cutoff, t̂OE−PA(s). As dis-
cussed earlier, the cutoff is exactly equal to 0 for s = h, but strictly greater than 0 for s = l.
Corollary 1(ii) discusses the model’s implications about the announcement period effects of prefer-
ential allotments. Upon announcement of a preferential allotment to owner-managers, the market
infers that the owner-managers must have seen a private signal, t > t̂OE−PA(s). Given that t
arises from a uniform distribution over the interval (−H,H), the market computes the expecta-
tion of t, conditional on the announcement of a preferential allotment, as equal to [t̂
OE−PA(s)+H]
2 .
Furthermore, since hidden value is given by the outcomes (t, 0), where each of the outcomes is
equally likely, the inferred expectation of the hidden value, conditional on a preferential allot-
ment is [t̂
OE−PA(s)+H]
4 . Corollary 1 (ii) states the announcement period returns for preferential
allotments in closed form after substituting for t̂OE−PA(s). Note that the announcement period
return is positive for preferential allotments.18 Furthermore, the announcement period reaction
depends on price path dynamics (s = l, h) and owner-managers’ shareholding (α), but is posi-
tively related to the degree of uncertainty in value of the assets-in-place, (h− l), and the degree
18The focus of our study is on preferential allotments, but the model also provides emprically testable impli-
cations for outside equity issues. The model suggests that the average inferred news about t, conditional on the
announcement of an outside equity issue, is equal to [−H+t̂
OE−PA(s)]
2
. Furthermore, since hidden value is given
by the outcomes (t, 0), where each of the outcomes is equally likely, the inferred expectation of the hidden value,
conditional on an outside equity issue is [−H+t̂
OE−PA(s)]
4
. On average, the announcement period reaction will be
negative, a la Myers and Majluf (1984). This implication is a well-documented empirical phenomenon across the
world. Furthermore, if s = l, the announcement period returns for outside equity would be less negative than if
s = h.
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of information asymmetry about the hidden value (t), as measured by H.19 Corollary 1 (iii)
identifies these relationships.
Figure 6: Owner-Managers Investment-Financing Decisions and Announcement Period
Returns.
Announcement
effect(∆P (s))
H/2
−H/2
1
16
[(s+x+y)(1−α)(h−s)]
[(s+x+y)+α4 (h−s)]
+ H
4
1
16
[(s+x+y)(1−α)(h−s)]
[(s+x+y)+α4 (h−s)]
− H
4
Issue price as per
SEBI formula price is at:
Market Value
Market Value
Market Value
Past Average
V0−(s = h)
V0−(s = h)
MaxbV−1,
V
−1+V0− (s=l)
2
c
V0−(s = l)
τ = −1
V−1 =
s=h
s=l
τ = 0−
V0−(s = h) =
V0−(s = l) =
Hidden
Value(t)
Financing
Choice
PA
OE
OE
PA
t ≥ t̂OE−PA
t < t̂OE−PA
t ≥ t̂OE−PA
t < t̂OE−PA
h+l
4 +
x+y
2 − I
h
2 +
x+y
2 − I
l
2 +
x+y
2 − I
3.5 Manipulation
From a social perspective, private placements to owner-managers are a positive institutional ar-
rangement.20 However, the price at which these shares are issued to insiders is critical because
managers may have incentives to manipulate share prices (in order to issues shares to them-
selves at discounts to the true value). Mechanisms such as the SEBI-mandated issue price (for
preferential allotments)try to ensure that manipulation of share prices yields lower benefits to
owner-managers, since they are forced to issue shares at a historical average price rather than
at the most recent valuation (as would be the case in an outside equity issue). This feature of
the SEBI preferential allotment regulations allows the market to preserve the social benefits of
preferential allotments, without too much of an adverse effect on minority shareholders. In this
subsection, we formulate a generalized version of the model that captures manipulation possibil-
19In Appendix A.1.8, we show that when RO is included as an additional choice, the annoucement effect simplifies
to ∆P = t¯+H
4
= h−l
16
+ H
4
. Hence, the announcement effect is independent of α, the owner-manager’s shareholding.
20The discussion does not deal with possible “tunneling” activity where owner-managers siphon resources from
the new project. For instance, see Bertrand et al. (2002).
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ities in order to develop testable empirical implications.21
In our model, we are indifferent as to what drives manipulation. We are just interested in
the influence of manipulation on the decision to opt for a preferential allotment. Therefore, we
define manipulation in the model by the variable w, which captures the dollar amount by which
the price level per share can be brought down before the announcement of a preferential issue.22
Owner-managers benefit from manipulation because they are able to issue shares at a lower price
(by an amount equal to w) than otherwise. Obviously, owner managers would want to increase
w by as much as possible. However, it is reasonable to assume that manipulation is a costly
exercise that may involve deadweight (fixed) costs, increasing marginal costs, as suggested in the
market microstructure literature (see Kyle (1985) and other studies on price impact of trades),
and finally, because manipulation is an illegal activity, it attracts penalties and reputation costs.
These costs are likely to be increasing in the degree of manipulation and it is safe to assume that
manipulation will be bounded within an upper limit due to such costs. Even within this upper
limit - a breakeven level of manipulation, beyond which costs of manipulation exceed benefits
of manipulation - owner-managers may prefer to choose an interior level of manipulation (w∗)
depending on the marginal costs and benefits of manipulation. For the purposes of our paper,
the exact nature of such an optimization exercise is of secondary importance. Therefore, we gen-
eralize our model under the assumption that the owner-managers choose a level of manipulation
given by w∗, where w∗ has been determined from an exogenously specified optimization exercise.23
In Appendix 1, we show that in this generalized model, the earlier results on the threshold
21In this paper, our objective of empirically testing the model on Indian securities market data can be achieved
under the assumption of an exogenous issue pricing rule (as shown in our model). However, from a policy per-
spective, it may be useful to develop a model of optimal regulation where the issue pricing rules in preferential
allotments are endogenously derived.
22Models of manipulation can be classified into trade-based manipulation models [Allen and Gorton (1992),
Brunnermeier (2000)], information based manipulation models [Benabou and Laroque (1992)] and action-based
[Bagnoli and Lipman (1996)] manipulation models. In trade-based manipulation models, prices are manipulated
using sophisticated trading strategies. In information-based manipulation models, prices are manipulated by
the strategic release of news about a firm. The classic popular legend regarding Nathan Rothschild’s alleged
opportunism during the Battle of Waterloo illustrates this style of manipulation. With the help of carrier-pigeons
and a network of spies, Rothschild came to know much before other traders in London that the Duke of Wellington
was about to defeat Napolean in the famous Battle of Waterloo. He asked his agents to vigorously sell consol
bonds (perpetual treasury bonds) issued by U.K. Treasury. Seeing this, other traders began to liquidate their
inventory of consols. Rothschild mopped up all these bonds at incredibly cheap price levels. When the news about
England’s success in the battle finally broke out, Rothschild’s strategy of manipulating Consol prices paid handsome
dividends! Other observers attribute the profits to shrewd analysis. Finally, in action-based manipulation models,
profitable trading positions are taken up just prior to a critical action that is initiated by a related party (for
instance, a takeover bid may be announced).
23We discuss the nature of such an optimization exercise in Appendix 1.
25
cutoffs stated in Proposition 1 get modified as follows:
t̂NI−PA(s) =
[
(s+ x+ y −
1
4
(h− s)− w∗)
][
I − αx+y2
I(1− α)
]
− (s+ x+ y) < 0, s = l, h (8)
t̂OE−PA(s) =
[
[s+ x+ y − w∗]
[
s+ x+ y − w∗ + 14(h− s)
]
(s+ x+ y −w∗) + α4 (h− s)
]
− (s+ x+ y) , s = l, h (9)
t̂OE−NI(s) = (s+ x+ y − w∗)
(x+y)
2
I
− (s+ x+ y), s = l, h (10)
Note that the critical cutoff, t̂OE−PA(s) is decreasing in w∗. The intuition behind this result
is straightforward. With manipulation, the issue price would be lower than otherwise; corre-
spondingly, a greater fraction of the firm (fOE(s) and fPA(s)) has to be put on sale to raise the
same amount of money. The effect of manipulation can be seen in Figure 4. The slopes of the
opportunity cost lines for OE and PA(s = l) change as the fraction of shares sold increases (the
opportunity cost line for the NI alternative remains unaffected). The net result is that both
lines become steeper - the OE opportunity cost line rotates clockwise and the PA opportunity
cost line rotates counterclockwise. The x -intercept of the point of intersection (i.e., t̂OE−PA(s))
of the OE and PA(s = l) opportunity cost lines shifts to the left. This implies that in a world
with manipulation, one can, ex-ante, expect a greater frequency of preferential allotments. This
result is consistent with our intuition that allowing the preferential allotment mechanism as a
feasible alternative encourages manipulation. Owner-managers consider private placements for
lower values of the private signal (t) than in a world where manipulation is restricted.24 It also
provides the basis for a testable empirical implication of the model, as will be discussed below. In
particular, it justifies the use of our empirical methdology to estimate the announcement effects
of privatge placements, in the presence of possible manipulation of prices.
3.6 Testable Hypotheses
We formulate the following hypotheses based on our model and the extant literature. Hy-
potheses H.1-H.5 are based on the empirical implications arising from the model and we refer to
these collectively as the Undervaluation Hypotheses.
24In the modification of the Takeover Code that is under discussion, SEBI proposes to increase the time interval
over which the average price will be computed to a period greater than six months.
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3.6.1 Hypotheses Based on the Model:
H.1 On average, the overall announcement period price reaction for preferential allotments
should be positive.
H.2 On average, the announcement period price reaction should be more positive if the prefer-
ential allotment occurs after a low price path (s = l), compared to an allotment that occurs
after a high price path (s = h).
H.3 On average, the announcement period price reaction should be positively related to the volatil-
ity of returns.
H.4 Conditional on an issue being made after a low price path (s = l), the average announce-
ment period reaction should be inversely related to the owner-managers’ pre-announcement
shareholding (α).
H.5 On average, the announcement price reaction should be negatively related to the leverage of
the firm.
Proposition 1 shows that the manager’s choice of financing depends on the signal of the hid-
den value (t), and whether s = h or s = l. The owner-managers favor preferential allotment for
positive signals of t, when s = h, and for sufficiently positive signals of t, when s = l. Hypothesis
H.1 states that announcement period reactions, on average, should be positive for preferential
allotments. It follows from Corollary 1 (ii).
One of the key drivers of empirical implications of the model is the cutoff, t̂OE−PA(s) . Note
that a change in any one of the parameters of the model triggers a response by owner-managers.
The response may either be an increase or a decrease in t̂OE−PA(s). An increase corresponds to a
more cautious preferential allotment policy in the sense that owner-managers become more selec-
tive in opting for the preferential allotment alternative. As a result, the average announcement
period reaction would be higher under a cautious policy. In contrast, a decrease in t̂OE−PA(s) cor-
responds to a more aggressive preferential allotment policy that results in a lower announcement
period return. As a result, a cross-sectional difference in environment would imply cross-sectional
differences in announcement period returns. Hypotheses H.2-H.4 are based on this line of rea-
soning.
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Hypothesis H.2 discusses the impact of the price path dynamics. When s = l, the SEBI-
imposed formula issue price is based on the historical average price, which is greater than the
most recent market valuation. As a result, the issue price reflects an additional premium, and
owner-managers become more cautious about preferential allotments when s = l than when s
= h. Owner-managers would choose a higher cutoff, t̂OE−PA(s)), for the s = l case. The an-
nouncement period reaction to preferential allotments when s = l would, therefore, be greater
than when s = h, because preferential allotments in the former case occur more selectively (i.e.,
for higher signals of t).
Hypotheses H.3-H.4 also follow directly from Corollary 1 (iii). First, the announcement pe-
riod reaction is positively related to H, which captures the magnitude of information asymmetry
about the hidden value (HV ). Further, the announcement period reaction is positively related
to (h− l), which captures the uncertainty in the value of the assets-in-place (AIP ). Now, since
the volatility of returns is positively related to uncertainty about both hidden value and asset-
in-place, it follows that the announcement period return should be increasing the volatility of
returns (Hypothesis H.3). In terms of intuition, more volatile stocks imply a greater amount of
information uncertainty (H), as well as higher additional premium (which depends on (h − l),
due to SEBI mandated issue-pricing restrictions). Although an increase in H does not affect the
cutoff, t̂OE−PA(s), it leads to a greater announcement effect (because it is equal to t̂
OE−PA(s)+H
4 ).
An increase in (h − l) results in a more cautious preferential allotment policy (a higher cutoff).
No matter what the source of the increase in the volatility of returns happens to be, it would
cause the announcement period reaction to increase.
Hypothesis H.4 follows after recognizing that the owner-managers’ shareholding, α, matters
only in the s = l state because t̂OE−PA(s) is 0, when s = h, but is non-zero only when s = l.
Note that owner-managers experience the greatest marginal benefit from a preferential allotment
when their shareholding (prior to the financing event) is high because the opportunity loss due
to dilution effects is higher when they hold more shares. This makes the PA alternative more
attractive than the OE alternative. Therefore, owner-managers use a lower threshold cutoff
value, t̂OE−PA(s), as a trigger for the preferential allotment alternative when they hold a greater
fraction of the firm. Conversely, when the shareholding is low, the threshold cutoff that triggers a
preferential allotment, increases. Thus, for a low α, when the market does observe a preferential
allotment, it infers that the managers have seen a highly positive signal of t. The announcement
period reactions to preferential allotments are, therefore, inversely related to the proportionate
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shareholding of the owner-managers.
Hypothesis H.5 states that leverage has a negative effect on announcement period returns.
It can be shown that t̂OE−PA(s = l) decreases with leverage.25 ,26 In other words, a leverage
increase induces a more aggressive policy of opting for the preferential allotment alternative, and
therefore, the announcement period effect decreases with leverage.27
3.6.2 Hypotheses Regarding Manipulation:
Manipulation is an important issue in the context of preferential allotments because it could
suggest empirical implications similar to those suggested by the information asymmetry expla-
nation proposed in this paper. In other words, manipulation could affect announcement period
effects associated with preferential allotments. This could happen in two ways. The first is be-
cause the announcement of a preferential allotment reveals to the market that owner-managers
might have been manipulating prices downward in the prior period. The market would then
correct itself with a positive adjustment, i.e., the announcement period reaction would be posi-
tive. We refer to this effect as the manipulation revelation effect. It suggests that, in a world of
manipulation, preferential allotments should be associated with positive announcement period
returns. This effect would arise even without information asymmetry.
In contrast, our model explicitly incorporates a second effect by which manipulation possibil-
ities occur in a world of information asymmetry. We show that owner-managers will use a lower
threshold cutoff to trigger preferential allotments when manipulation is possible, thereby leading
25Suppose debt payments amounting to the face value of debt are due on the liquidation date (τ = 1). An
easy way to assess the impact of leverage is to assume that h and l reflect cash flows arising from asset-in-place
(AIP ) net of face value payments on debt contracts. Thus, an increase in debt can be modeled as a reduction in
the cash flow from assets-in-place (AIP ), namely, h and l. The impact of leverage can be seen by differentiating
t̂OE−PA(s = l) in Equation 3, after noting that leverage does not affect the difference (h− l) but affects l only.
26When a rights offering, RO, is included as a choice, the announcement effect of leverage is zero, i.e., leverage
does not affect the announcement effect.
27It is also important to note that leverage, in general, can have a direct exogenous affect on announcement
period returns. In the context of our model, a leverage-induced symmetric reduction in h and l only changes the
mean of cash flows (arising from assets-in-place (AIP )) without affecting the volatility of cash flows because h and
l arise from a binary distribution with equally likely outcomes. Thus announcement period price reaction will not
change with leverage because the volatility of cash flows, (h− l), is invariant to leverage. However, announcement
period returns would increase because the denominator of returns, namely equity value, decreases with leverage.
This implication suggests a positive relationship between announcement period returns and leverage, whereas the
model suggests a negative relationship. It is an empirical question as to which effect will dominate or whether
these two effects will offset each other.
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to a lower announcement period effect. This aggressive preferential allotment policy effect arises
purely due to information asymmetry issues. Note that this effect implies a lower announcement
period return in a world of manipulation - exactly opposite to that suggested by the manipulation
revelation effect. It is an empirical matter as to which of the two effects dominates.
H.6 On average, the announcement period reaction should be decreasing in the illiquidity of the
firm’s stock.
H.7 On average, the announcement period price reaction should be positively (negatively) related
to the abnormal returns (abnormal volume) experienced during the six-month prior to the
announcement date.
Hypotheses H.6 and H.7 are useful because they present testable propositions that arise in
a world of information asymmetry and manipulation. Hypothesis H.6 follows because illiquidity
reduces the costs of manipulating asset prices (market prices move much more in a direction fa-
vorable to owner-managers for a given amount of investment in manipulation). In illiquid stocks,
manipulation is easier and owner-managers would employ even lower threshold cutoffs to trigger
a preferential allotment (as a result, the announcement period reaction would be lower). As
stated in Hypothesis H.6, the announcement period reaction should be inversely related to the
illiquidity of the stock.
Two alternative empirical proxies for manipulation are the abnormal volume and the abnor-
mal return in the six-month period prior to the announcement date. If manipulation (in the
period prior to the announcement) causes a depressed stock price, it would result in a negative
(or a lower) abnormal return during this period than in a world without manipulation. In ad-
dition, an indirect indication of manipulation is the abnormal trading volume in the six month
period prior to the announcement. Hence, in the presence of manipulation (as measured by a
lower abnormal return or a higher abnormal volume in the six month period prior to the an-
nouncement date), the announcement period return would be lower than otherwise. In other
words, the announcement period price reaction should be positively (negatively) related to the
abnormal return (volume) experienced during the six-month period prior to the announcement
date). Hypothesis H.7 is a unique testable proposition of our model.
3.6.3 Hypotheses Based on Existing Literature:
Our empirical tests are based on a set of preferential allotments issued to all types of buy-
ers (not just owner-managers, but also to private equity firms, banks and financial institutions)
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because our basic model is applicable in all these cases. It is therefore important to allow for com-
peting hypotheses generated in the context of private placements. Although some of the above
predictions are unique to our model (Hypotheses H.2, H.3, and H.4), the remaining predictions
can also arise in the context of alternative hypotheses. For instance, Hypothesis H.1 (positive an-
nouncement period returns) is also implied by the Monitoring Hypothesis (private equity players
provide better monitoring) as well as the Certification Hypothesis (presence of private equity is a
credible signal of hidden value). Note also that exactly the converse of Hypothesis H.1 is implied
by the Entrenchment Hypothesis, which suggests that private placements should be associated
with negative announcement period returns because of managerial self-dealing.
Hypothesis H.4 applies to the sub-sample of preferential allotments that follow a low price
path (s = l). The same implication, as applied to the entire sample could also arise in the
context of the Entrenchment Hypothesis, which states that high managerial ownership should
result in greater self-dealing, and hence, lower announcement period returns. Interestingly, the
Monitoring Hypothesis implies that the announcement period reaction should increase in the
owner-managers’ share-holding, because the value of monitoring is higher if the manager holds
a higher ownership stake. This prediction is exactly opposite to that from our model and from
the Entrenchment Hypothesis. Empirical tests of competing hypotheses can, therefore, help us
understand the relative importance of the various alternative hypotheses in explaining private
placements in the Indian capital markets.
In addition to the hypotheses based on our model, we also test the following hypotheses that
arise from the existing literature:
H.8 Preferential Allotments issued by business group affiliated firms should experience under-
reaction compared to stand-alone firms.
Baek, Kang, and Lee (2006) find that group firms are able to expropriate shareholder wealth
by issuing shares at steep discounts in private placements. As noted earlier, business groups in
India often engage in private placements. Given the propensity of business groups to transfer
resources across companies (see for example, Rajan, Zingales and Sarvaes, 2000), it is likely that
private placements by business groups will be viewed less favorably than private placements made
by stand-alone firms. This prediction is also consistent with the Entrenchment Hypothesis.
H.9 Preferential allotments made to private equity investors should experience a more positive
reaction compared to preferential allotments made to banks and financial institutions.
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Hypothesis H.9 is a manifestation of the Monitoring Hypothesis and is confirmed in the stud-
ies of Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Barclay et al. (2007). There is evidence to suggest that
private equity players are active shareholders (Monitoring Hypothesis) and often possess supe-
rior information about the prospects of a firm (Certification Hypothesis). On the other hand,
banks and financial institutions are likely to be passive shareholders (Entrenchment Hypothesis),
especially in the context of India where preferential allotments to banks are often the result of
financial restructuring when debt is stressed. The net effect from any or all of these hypotheses
is that the market views preferential allotments to banks and financial institutions less favorably
than preferential allotments to private equity players.
The detailed hypotheses discussed above can be related to the various theories advanced in
the literature relating to announcement effects of private placements. To summarize, Hypotheses
H.1 - H.5 can classified as the Undervaluation Hypotheses, H.1, (the converse of) H.4, and H.8
as the Monitoring Hypotheses, H.1 and H.8 as the Certification Hypotheses, H.1, H.4, H.8, and
H.9 as the Entrenchment Hypotheses, and H.6 and H.7 as the Manipulation Hypotheses.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present empirical tests of hypotheses developed in the previous subsection.
First, we discuss the construction of the data sample. Then, we provide details of the empirical
methodology used to determine the abnormal return and volume measures used to test the
hypotheses. Finally, we present summary statistics that describe the data and results associated
with our tests.
4.1 Construction of the Database
We obtained data from several sources for building our database of preferential allotments of eq-
uity in India. We started with news reports from Bloomberg regarding the announcement dates
of preferential allotments of equity. These were matched with corresponding data obtained from
the corporate announcements site of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). Once the firms had
been identified, the details of the preferential allotments (available as .pdf files) were obtained
by searching for each individual firm in the corporate actions dataset on the BSE website. We
manually digitized the available .pdf files, extracting data on issue price, names of buyers, types
of buyers, purpose of issuing preferential shares, number of shares issued to each subscriber, and
proportion of the shares issued to the total share capital of the firm. Using this procedure, we
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were able to obtain a sample of 175 preferential allotments made by BSE-listed firms during the
period 2001-2009. In addition, we also obtained firm level financial, ownership, and stock price
data from the Prowess database of the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). These
data were matched with the data on preferential allotments. After completing the matching ex-
ercise, our final sample was reduced to 164 preferential allotments, due to unavailability of firm
level data for some firms.
The definitions used for identifying family business group affiliated firms and stand-alone
firms as well as the industry classification of firms in the sample were also obtained from Prowess.
(The Prowess industry classification is similar to the 3-digit SIC code in the U.S.) Our sample
of preferential allotments is spread across 42 industries with no significant concentration in any
one industry. However, software, infrastructure and banking firms each account for more than
5% of the total number of issues.
4.2 Measurement of Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Volume
In order to test the hypotheses related to manipulation, we computed the Cumulative Abnor-
mal Return (CAR) and the Cumulative Abnormal Volume(CAV ), over the period prior to the
announcement date. Announcement period reactions are estimated by calculating these values
around the announcement date. We used the standard single-factor market model to measure
the abnormal return on a stock around the announcement date of the preferential allotment. The
model is specified as follows:
Ri,t = ai + biRm,t + εi,t, (11)
where Ri,t is the return to security i at time t, Rm,t is the corresponding market return, bi is the
sensitivity parameter estimate for security i, ai is the intercept term for security i and εit is the
error term. Abnormal return is defined as the estimated error term for a particular security for
a given time.
Given that the announcement day of the offer is defined as day 0 in the event window period,
abnormal returns are calculated over event window periods of [-1 to +1], [-5 to +5] and [-10 to
+10] trading days around the announcement day of the issue. The estimation period used to
calculate the parameters in Equation 11 comprises returns over days [-240 to -31] prior to the
announcement day of the issue. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of stock i for the [-10 to
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+10] window can be defined as follows (the CARs for the other windows are defined similarly):
CARit =
+10∑
t=−10
ARi,nt (12)
Cumulative Abnormal Volume is estimated using a model akin to the market model where
the daily volume of a security is regressed on the corresponding day’s market volume.28 We
measure market volume as the value-weighted trading volume of the top 1,000 Bombay Stock
Exchange(BSE) listed securities.
Vi,t = ci + diVm,t + νi,t, (13)
where Vi,t is the actual volume for the security i on day t and Vm,t is the market volume.
Abnormal volume is defined as the estimated error term for a given time. CAV, which is similar
to CAR, is defined as follows:
CAVi,t =
+10∑
t=−10
AVi,t. (14)
We calculate the CAR and CAV for three specific windows namely CAV(-22,-32), CAV(-22,-
154) and CAV(-22,-250).The numbers for the three windows correspond to the respective days
before the announcement date. The first two windows are used to capture abnormal volumes
during the two periods used to compute the SEBI-mandated issue price. The third window (CAV
-22, -250) is used to check for robustness.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample data. Our sample consists of 164 pref-
erential allotments, of which 91 were made to insiders (promoters or owner-managers), 73 to
private equity players, and banks and other outsiders. The variables in the data are presented
under different categories - firm, issue and investor characteristics, and the size of the insider
holdings. Since there were a few outliers at either end of the data, we winsorized one percent
of the sample at both the high and low end for the following variables: illiquidity, volatility,
interest coverage, and debt equity ratio. The average firm size is Indian Rupees 1,956.35 million,
the average illiquidity (as measured by the Amihud measure of illiquidity) is 6.18%, the average
daily volatility (of stock returns) is 4.01%, the average interest coverage is 6.03, and the average
28Cumulative Abnormal Volume (CAV) is commonly used in empirical analysis of manipulation. For example,
Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) uses CAV while investigating insider trading in corporate takeovers.
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debt equity ratio is 0.93. The issue size, on average, is 60% of the promoter’s equity or about
16% of the outstanding shares. Owner-managers and private equity investors subscribe to the
placements in roughly equal measure at around 45% each, with the balance being subscribed by
banks. On average, the owner-manager’s stake prior to the issue is 42.39%.
To gain a more detailed understanding of the data, we stratify our sample in three ways: 1)
the group affiliation of the firm, if any, 2) the price path (“high” or “low”), which determines the
SEBI-mandated minimum issue price, and 3) the type of investor. Group firms, on average, are
significantly larger (almost three times) than stand-alone firms. In addition, group firms are more
liquid, but experience similar volatility levels as that of stand-alone firms. Group firms are more
levered, by a large margin, in terms of their interest coverage than stand-alone firms. In terms of
the debt-equity ratio, however, there is no significant difference between the two groups. We can
also see that stand-alone firms relied less on private equity as compared to group-affiliated firms
(35.2% vs. 49.5%). Other than size and extent of private equity investment, there are no other
significant differences in the issue characteristics between the group-affiliated and stand-alone
firms, since the two categories of firms appear to have large cross-sectional variation on other
dimensions. In particular, we find that issue size, in terms of the owner-managers’ holdings or
the number of shares outstanding, is not significantly different between the two groups.
In a similar vein, we divide the sample into issues that are placed after a high price path and
those that are placed after a low price path. The average weekly price in the two-week period
prior to the relevant date is compared with the average weekly price in the six-month period prior
to the relevant date.29 If the former is greater, the price path is classified as a “high” price path.
If the latter is greater, the price path is classified as a “low” price path. Upon classification of the
preferential allotments into those that occur after a “high” price path and those that occur after
a “low” price path, we find that there are no significant differences in terms of issue characteris-
tics between these two groups, as shown in Table 1. When the data are stratified by the type of
investor, owner-managers (promoters) versus outsiders, we find no significant differences between
the two groups, except for the interest coverage ratio. The firms in which the owner-managers
hike their stakes through the preferential allotment are, on average, less leveraged than the others.
29The relevant date is itself 30 days (or 22 trading days) prior to the date of the Extra Ordinary General Meeting
that seeks shareholder approval of the preferential allotment. This meeting occurs soon after the announcement
date, but the exact date of the EGM is not readily available for our sample firms. We, therefore, make the
assumption that the EGM date coincides with the announcement date. Thus, the relevant date is assumed to be
one month (22 trading days) before the announcement date.
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The above findings are important because some of the hypotheses being tested apply to the
sub-sample of issues that are based either on group affiliation (Hypothesis H.8) or price path
dynamics (Hypothesis H.2) or purchaser type (Hypothesis H.9). Overall, the results reported
in Table 1 assure us that our empirical tests based on sub-samples are free from any obvious
selection bias.
4.3 Announcement Period Returns
Table II reports announcement period returns in the form of CARs for three different windows
[CAR(-1, +1), CAR(-5, +5)and CAR (-10, +10)] around the announcement dates of preferen-
tial allotments.30 , 31 We study these three windows to take into account possible liquidity effects
due to thin trading. To the extent that thin trading is an issue, the CAR(-1,+1) results are less
reliable than the CAR(-5,+5) and the CAR(-10,+10) results. The table is divided into seven
panels, the first one is related to the overall sample, and the other six are based on different
classification criteria. The objective of this classification is to examine whether, at the univariate
level, there are any significant differences in the announcement period returns across different
groups based on Hypotheses H.1-H.5 and H.8-H.9.
Table II, Panel A reports the overall announcement period effects for the total sample of 164
preferential allotment announcements. Consistent with Hypothesis H.1, Panel A reports that the
overall announcement period effect for preferential allotments is significantly positive for the 5-
and 10-day windows around the announcement date, with the effect for the 1-day window being
only marginally significant. This finding is consistent with those of other empirical studies of
private placements.
We now turn to the announcement effects for various slices of the sample. Panel B and Figure
7 indicate that, while the announcement effects for the low-price path are significantly positive,
the effects for the high price path are not significantly different from zero. Further, on average,
30As a robustness check, we also computed the CARs with alternative definitions of the windows for estimation
of the slope coefficients in the market model regressions in Equation 11. In addition, we estimated the CARs
with only an adjustment for the market return - in effect assuming that all the slope coefficients are one. These
alternative estimations yielded qualitatively similar results, which are not reported here in the interest of brevity.
31We also examined longer windows to study the long-term wealth effects of the announcement [CAR(-1, +480)]
and find, in contrast to Hertzel et al. (2002), that the long term announcement effects of Indian preferential
allotments are also positive. Our results are consistent with Barclay et al. (2007), who argue that positive long
term wealth effects are consistent with the Certification Hypothesis.
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low-price path issues have significantly higher positive abnormal return than high-price path is-
sues in the case of the 10-day window. Both these results are consistent with Hypothesis H.2.
Panel C reports the announcement effect for sub-groups stratified by volatility into those
that are below the median and those that are above the median. According to Hypothesis H.3,
higher volatility of returns should imply greater announcement effects because (i) the market in-
fers more good news from a preferential allotment when the uncertainty about the hidden value
(asymmetric information) is high, and (ii) owner-managers follow a more cautious preferential
allotment policy when the uncertainty in the value of assets-in-place is high. The announcement
effects for the two sub-groups are significant in both cases for the 5- and 10-day windows, but
not as clear-cut for the 1-day window. However, we do not find any statistically significant dif-
ferences between the sub-groups. The evidence at the univariate level seems to be inconsistent
with Hypothesis H.3.
Panel D shows the announcement period returns for preferential allotments, where owner-
managers hold a higher (lower) than median ownership stake in the firm prior to the announce-
ment date. We can see that the announcement period returns are positive for each of the two
sub-groups. This univariate result is inconsistent with Hypothesis H.4. Panel E reports the
announcement effect for two sub-groups stratified by leverage, measured by the interest coverage
ratio, into those that are below the median and those that are above the median. The interest
coverage ratio is a better measure of leverage in our case due to the large variation in debt-equity
ratios across the sample for firms in different industries. The announcement effects for the two
sub-groups are significant in both cases for the 5- and 10-day windows, but not as clear-cut
for the 1-day window. However, we do not find any statistically significant differences between
the sub-groups in both cases. Our model suggests that higher interest coverage (lower leverage)
should lead to greater announcement effects. The evidence at the univariate level seems to be
inconsistent with Hypothesis H.5.
Panel F and Figure 8 report announcement period returns for group-affiliated firms and
stand-alone firms. CARs for group-affiliated firms are significantly lower than that for stand-
alone firms, for the 10-day window. The results for the other windows are in the same direction,
but the differences between the two groups are statistically significant only for the CAR (-10,
+10) window. This evidence at the univariate level is consistent with Hypothesis H.8. Finally,
Panel G and Figure 9 report announcement period returns based on the type of investor, namely,
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promoter (controlling owner-managers), banks and private equity firms separately (Hypothesis
H.9). The announcement period effect indicates that most of the significant positive news from
preferential allotments comes from placements to owner-managers. The announcement effect for
private equity investors is significant, but only for the 10-day window. Interestingly, the effect for
banks is not significant. These results suggest, however, that there are no significant differences
in the announcement effects between the investor types.
Overall, the univariate findings seem to support some of hypotheses that follow from our
model; however, we require a more robust multivariate regression analysis that controls for other
factors before drawing any meaningful inferences.32
Multivariate regression results are reported in Table III.33 All regressions use CAR (-10,
+10) as the dependent variable, since this measure would be least affected by possible thin-
trading effects. The explanatory variables are arranged by category - firm characteristics, issue
characteristics, investor characteristics and owner-manager stake. Regressions 1-3 employ the
entire sample, but Regression 4 uses a sub-sample of preferential allotments that follow after a
low price path, as required under Hypothesis H.4.
Regressions 2 and 3 test Hypothesis H.2, which states that preferential allotments occur-
ring after a low price path should lead to greater announcement effects. The coefficient on the
high price path dummy is significantly negative, indicating that preferential allotments issued
after a low price path experience higher abnormal returns. Regarding firm characteristics, the
announcement date abnormal returns are inversely related to size, a control. As for volatility,
Hypothesis H.3 suggests that higher volatility of prices (either due to a higher uncertainty in
the assets-in-place or due to a higher degree of information asymmetry about the hidden value)
leads to a greater announcement effect. This conjecture is confirmed in all four regressions.34 In
terms of economic significance, the results indicate that, for one standard deviation change in
32To control for any bias in the estimates due to thin trading we also used a “trade-to-trade” returns approach
that is based on multi-period event returns, as proposed by Maynes and Rumsey (1993) to address illiquidity
effects. The results based on the thin trade-adjusted market model, although not reported, are similar to the
results based on conventional market model as reported in the Equation 11. It turns out that only four stocks in
the sample had any gaps in the data due to non-trading.
33To be consistent with our theoretical model, we also ran regressions using only those issues that were made
exclusively to promoters (owner-managers). The number of such placements in our sample was 91. The results are
qualitatively similar to the results reported in Table 3, which uses the full sample of 164 preferential allotments
(with proper controls).
34We also used the volatility of market model residuals - an estimate of the idiosyncratic risk - rather than total
volatility of returns and obtained similar results.
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volatility, the CAR would rise by 0.957 percent.
As discussed earlier, the model suggests a more aggressive preferential allotment policy as
leverage increases, and therefore, lower announcement period effects. However, announcement
period returns can mechanically be positively related to leverage simply because expected re-
turns are inversely related to the proportion of equity, which is decreasing in leverage. Despite
this exogenous effect, the empirical results suggest that announcement returns are significantly
negatively related to leverage (Hypothesis H.5). It can be seen that for a one standard deviation
change in the interest coverage ratio, the CAR would rise by 0.06 percent, in the direction pre-
dicted by Hypothesis H.5. We also find that the coefficient on the group dummy is negative and
insignificant in all the regressions. This result does not support Hypothesis H.8 that abnormal
returns are lower for group firms than for stand-alone firms. This result is inconsistent with the
Entrenchment Hypothesis posed in Baek, Kang, and Lee (2006).
According to Hypothesis H.9, the announcement effects associated with private equity in-
vestors should be stronger than those for banks or financial institutions. Regression 3 tests this
hypothesis and shows that preferential allotments issued to owner-managers do not clearly expe-
rience higher positive reaction than private equity investors or banks. The signs and magnitudes
of the coefficients on the private equity dummy and banks dummy are in the right direction, but
statistically insignificant, i.e., they suggest that there is a rank ordering of announcement period
returns with the highest returns occurring for owner-manager placements and the lowest for bank
placements. While the evidence in Regression 3 is weak, the results in Regression 4 support our
model strongly. The coefficient on the private equity dummy is negative and significant. Private
equity investors are often assumed to have superior information (Certification Hypothesis) or
assumed to provide an active role in monitoring the firm (Monitoring Hypothesis). Thus, after
accounting for controls, there is no support for Hypothesis H.9, i.e., these findings do not support
the Monitoring Hypothesis (Wruck, 1989) or the Certification Hypothesis (Hertzel and Smith,
1993). This evidence also goes against the Entrenchment Hypothesis, which states that private
placements are typically made to acquire passive shareholders and should be accompanied by
negative price reaction.
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Regression 4 is specially designed to test Hypothesis H.4. The regression sample consists
only of those issues that follow after a low price path.35 The hypothesis states that the average
announcement reaction should be inversely related to the pre-announcement holding of the owner
manager. However, the results under Regression 4 column of Table III do not support the
hypothesis relating to the owner-manager’s stake.36 To summarize, the univariate tests confirm
Hypothesis H.1, and the multivariate regressions suggest evidence in favor of Hypothesis H.2,
H.3, and H.5. Hypothesis H.4 is not confirmed in the empirical tests.
4.4 Testing Hypotheses related to Manipulation
As we discussed in the theoretical section on manipulation, owner-managers have incentives
to manipulate the stock price level in the period prior to the announcement date of a preferen-
tial allotment. Such manipulation would be in the self-interest of owner-managers because they
would be able to issue shares to themselves at lower than the fair market value. This empirical
section examines the extent of managerial self-dealing. It is important to note that our empir-
ical tests ought to control for the fact that manipulation of prices prior to the announcement
date can affect announcement period returns. If the market believes that owner-managers ma-
nipulate prices downward prior to announcement of preferential allotments, there would be a
positive announcement effect (manipulation revelation effect). On the other hand, as shown in
our model, manipulation induces owner-managers to pursue an aggressive preferential allotment
policy, which causes a reduction in the announcement effect. The manipulation revelation effect
suggest a positive relationship between announcement period returns and manipulation proxies.
In contrast, the aggressive preferential allotment policy effect suggests a negative relationship
between announcement period returns and manipulation proxies. It is an empirical question as
to which of these two effects dominates, which we will examine in this section.
The first manipulation proxy we consider is illiquidity of the firms’ stock. We argue that the
greater the illiquidity, the lower is the cost that owner-managers incur if they invest in manipu-
lating the stock price in the period prior to the announcement of a preferential allotment. Thus,
we should see a greater degree of manipulation in more illiquid stocks. To measure illiquidity,
we use the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Amihud (2002)). If the manipulation revelation ef-
fect dominates, one would see a positive relationship between announcement period returns and
35An alternative approach would be to introduce interactive effects between the path dummy and the explanatory
variables. However, this would not be in line with the explicit hypothesis our model suggests. In any event, we
tried this approach also and found that the results were somewhat weaker, as expected.
36However, the results are consistent with the extended model presented in Appendix A1.8, which includes a
rights offering, RO, as a financing choice.
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illiquidity. On the other hand, if the model’s predicted aggressive preferential allotment policy
effect dominates, one should see a negative relationship between announcement period returns
and illiquidity.
To probe the manipulation story more deeply, we also use information contained in the price
and volume run up before the announcement period to build proxies for the effects of manip-
ulation. The first proxy under this category is the cumulative abnormal volume (CAV ) in the
pre-announcement period. If there is price manipulation, it is likely to be accompanied by higher
abnormal trading volume. The second proxy is cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the pre-
announcement period, which is possibly a better indicator of manipulation.37
We use two different time windows to define the period prior to the announcement period.
As discussed earlier, the SEBI-mandated issue price is based on the maximum of the average
price in the two-week period prior to the relevant date and the average price in the six-month
period prior to the relevant date. Thus, proxies to assess manipulation should examine these
two trading windows prior to the relevant date. The two week period prior to the relevant date
would then be (-22, -32) interval relative to the announcement date, assuming that 2 weeks is
equivalent to 10 trading days. Hence, we define the two windows to be over the periods (-22, -32),
(-22, -154).38 The first window captures price manipulation that affects the most recent valua-
tion and the second window captures price manipulation that affects the six-month average price.
The cumulative abnormal volume (CAV ) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) are com-
puted for all three windows described above. Panel A of Table IV reports univariate results
of these three windows for CAR, and CAV. We find that CAR for all the three windows is
positive; CAR (-22, -32) and CAR (-22, -250) are both statistically significant. If price ma-
nipulation were rampant, one would expect to see negative CARs in the period prior to the
announcement date. However, it could also be argued that CARs could possibly have been even
higher. In other words, price manipulation does not necessarily imply negative CARs, rather it
implies lower CARs than otherwise. One cannot therefore rule out manipulation on the basis
37As a robustness check, we also computed an alternative proxy of action-based manipulation, the cumulative
abnormal turnover (CAT ), which is defined in a manner similar to CAV except that the volume is scaled by the
number of shares outstanding.
38We also examined a third window (-22, -250), covering the entire year prior to the announcement date, to
check the robustness of our specification, and find that the results are similar; hence, we do not report them here
to conserve space.
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of positive CARs in the period prior to the announcement period.39 Panel B reports the corre-
lation between CAR and CAV. As can be expected, there is some positive correlation between
the same variables defined over different windows. However, the correlations are stronger only
when there is significant overlap between the periods, i.e., the (-22, -154) and (-22, -250) windows.
Table V presents the results associated with the tests of Hypothesis H.6 and H.7. Essentially,
these regressions extend the regression analysis of Table III by including the proxies of manipula-
tion in Regression 3 of that table. Our first test (of Hypothesis H.6) is based on market illiquidity
as a proxy for manipulation. The more illiquid the stock is, the easier it would be to push the
price downwards even with a low trading volume. Hence, the greater the illiquidity, the greater
is the ease of effective manipulation. Table V, Regression 1 (and all the remaining regressions in
the table) show that announcement period returns are negatively related to the log of the Ami-
hud measure of illiquidity. This result suggests that the aggressive preferential allotment policy,
which reflects information asymmetry issues of our model, dominates the manipulation revelation
effect. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the main thesis of our paper that information
asymmetry is a key driver of the preferential allotment decision. This result also suggests that,
for one standard deviation change in the metric of illiquidity, the CAR is reduced by 0.11 percent.
Hypothesis H.7 discusses the key empirical tests related to the prior period price and volume
based proxies of the degree of manipulation. It says that announcement period returns should
be positively related to the prior period CAR and negatively related to prior period CAV. In di-
rect contrast, the manipulation revelation effect argues exactly the opposite: that announcement
period returns should be negatively related to prior period CAR and positively related to prior
period CAV.
Regressions 2-5 in Table V contain the manipulation variables CAR (-22, -32), CAR (-22,
-154), CAV (-22, -32), and CAV (-22, -154).40 These regressions show that the coefficients on
the two CAR variables are positive and significant, although the CAR(-22, -154) variable is only
marginally so. For instance, to understand the economic significance, the coefficient in Regression
2 implies that for one standard deviation change in the CAR(-22, - 32), the contemporaneous
39However, it is always possible that information-based or action-based manipulation was taking place; it is
conceivable that such manipulative strategies may not be accompanied by abnormal volume. Thus, lack of abnormal
volume is not sufficient evidence to preclude the occurrence of manipulation.
40We do not report results for the (-22, -250) window, since due to the substantial overlap with the (-22, -
154) window, they are fairly similar. Also, we do not report the results for the CAT proxies because they are
qualitatively similar to the results obtained with CAV proxies.
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CAR would increase by 2.42 percent. As with the illiquidity proxy of manipulation, these results
are also consistent with the model’s aggressive preferential allotment policy effect rather than
the manipulation revelation effect. However, the two CAV variables do not have significant co-
efficients when added to the regression. One possibility is that manipulation may be based on
avenues other than trade-based techniques, e.g., adverse information dissemination.
Interestingly, all the variables that were significantly related to announcement period re-
turns (Table III) continue to retain their significance in Table V. These findings assure us that
the conclusions drawn from Table III are robust to empirical specifications that account for
manipulation. Overall, our results also suggest the presence of manipulation. At first glance,
these findings seem to provide some degree of support for the Entrenchment Hypothesis, which
states that managers indulge in self-dealing behavior. However, the empirical evidence should be
viewed more in terms of market efficiency rather than managerial entrenchment. The evidence
only suggests that the market environment permits manipulation and is not a direct test of the
Entrenchment Hypothesis. Rather, our results strongly suggest that manipulation is driven by
information asymmetry issues, as captured in the model.
To summarize the conclusions of our empirical analysis, we find statistically significant sup-
port for the key empirical implications of the model presented in this paper. In particular, we
find that the announcement period reaction to preferential allotments is positive (Hypothesis
H.1), the announcement period reaction is more positive for preferential allotments that follow
a low price path (Hypothesis H.2). We find that announcement period returns are positively
related to volatility (Hypothesis H.3) but we find mixed evidence about the relationship between
announcement period reactions and the owner-managers’ stake prior to the announcement (Hy-
pothesis H.4).41 Announcement period returns are negatively related to leverage (Hypothesis
H.5). Overall, the evidence in H1.-H.5 is largely supportive of the Undervaluation Hypothesis
presented in the model. We also develop model-specific hypotheses on manipulation (Hypothesis
H.6 and H.7) and find evidence in support of the possibility of the model’s predicted information
asymmetry driven manipulative behavior. All our key findings are robust in the sense that they
persist after controlling for manipulation. Our analysis also sheds light on the Monitoring Hy-
pothesis, Certification Hypothesis and Entrenchment Hypothesis that have been proposed in the
existing literature on private placements. Results based on tests of Hypothesis H.8 and H.9 show
41Our empirical findings are consistent with the extended version of the model presented in Appendix A.1.8,
which includes a rights offering, RO, as a financing alternative.
43
little support for the Monitoring Hypothesis, the Certification Hypothesis or the Entrenchment
Hypothesis in the context of Indian capital markets.
5 Conclusion
The empirical literature on private placements of equity suggests managerial entrenchment is
perhaps the most important driver of the private placement decision. One would imagine that
entrenchment would be of even greater concern for private placements made to owner-managers.
Yet, the popularity of private placements to owner-managers, particularly in emerging markets,
suggests that there is more to the story than just managerial entrenchment.
In this paper, we propose an extension of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model to show that
preferential allotments to owner-managers can resolve the underinvestment problem. This result
seems intuitive - there is no information asymmetry problem when insiders finance the equity
issue, and therefore, there is likely to be no underinvestment. It is likely that owner-managers are
critical sources of capital in emerging markets and the benefits of resolving the underinvestment
problem may outweigh qualms about managerial self-dealing (in the form of a lower issue price),
especially given the buffer provided by the regulatory restrictions on the pricing of preferential
allotments. Indeed, we find evidence supporting our model in a sample of preferential allotments
in the Indian market. Our results are robust to the possibility of manipulation and support the
Undervaluation Hypothesis, which follows from an application of the Myers and Majluf (1984)
model to a market environment that has distinctly different institutional arrangements from
those typically found in developed markets. Our model could also be extended to examine the
general problem of optimal regulation of private placements.
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Appendix 1: Proofs of Proposition 1 and Extensions
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let N denote the number of original shares outstanding, n the number of new shares issued
(either in the outside equity issue or in the preferential allotment), P the issue price, V0− (P0−)
the pre-announcement market value (price per share) of the firm at date τ = 0−, and V0+ (P0+)
the post-announcement value (price per share) of the firm at date τ = 0+. Then, P0− =
V0−
N
and
P0+ =
V0+
(N+n) , where n new shares are issued at an issue price P to raise the capital (I ) required
to invest in the positive NPV investment opportunity.
The pre-announcement market value of the firm will be given by the sum of the market value
of the assets-in-place (AIP) and the NPV of the investment opportunity (IO), which is equal to
x+y
2 − I. On this date, the market’s expectation of the hidden value (HV ) is zero.
42 Since the
expected value of assets-in-place (AIP) is equal to s/2, it follows that V0−(s = h) =
h
2
+ x+y
2
−I
and V0−(s = l) =
l
2
+ x+y
2
− I. In general,
P0−(s) =
V0−(s)
N
=
s
2 +
x+y
2 − I
N
, s = l, h (1)
A.1.2 Fraction of shares “sold” in an outside equity issue
When n shares are issued at price P to raise a capital of I, n = I /P and f, the fraction of the
firm that has to be “sold” is given by
f(s) =
n
N + n
=
I
P
N + I
P
=
I
NP + I
, s = l, h (2)
If capital is raised from outsiders (OE), the issue price, P, will be equal to P0−(s). In a
competitive market, outsiders would be unwilling to pay anything more than P0−(s). Since
owner-managers would want to issue shares to outsiders at the highest possible price, the issue
42Note that V0−(s) should reflect the market’s expectation of the Hidden Value (HV ), conditional on owner-
manager’s investment-financing policy. In equilibrium, it will be shown that owner-managers always invest in
the positive NPV project under the conditions stated in Proposition 1. The financing policy of owner-managers
is characterized by a cutoff signal value (t∗(s)), below which outside equity (OE) is employed and above which
preferential allotment (PA) is used. Given that t arises from a uniform distribution over (−H,H), the market’s
expectation of the Hidden Value (HV ) is equal to (Prob(t < t∗(s))(E(t|OE) + (Prob(t ≥ t∗(s))(E(t|PA). This
implies that the market expectation of t conditional on owner-mangers’ investment-financing policy is given by:
(H+t∗(s))
2H
(−H+t∗(s))
2
+ (H−t
∗(s))
2H
(t∗(s)+H)
2
= 0. Thus, in either case (s = h or s = l), the market’s expectation of
the Hidden Value (HV ) is equal to zero.
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price will be set at P0−(s), and Equation 2 implies that
fOE(s) =
I
NP0−(s) + I
=
I
s
2 +
x+y
2
, s = l, h (3)
after using the result in Equation 1.
A.1.3 Fraction of shares “sold” in a preferential allotment
On the other hand, if n shares are issued in a preferential allotment, the issue price is not
determined by a competitive process. If V−1 denotes the market value at time τ = −1, the issue
price will be constrained by the pricing formula as follows:
P ≥
Max[V0−(s),
V0− (s)+V−1
2 ]
N
, (4)
Equation 4 states that the issue price should be greater than or equal to the higher of the current
valuation, V0− , and the average price in the previous period from time τ = -1 to τ = 0
−. Since
the owner-managers would prefer to issue shares (to themselves) at the lowest possible price, the
inequality in Equation 4 will be binding. Note that V−1 is given as follows (after using the result
in Equation 1):
V−1 = V0−(s = h)pi(s = h) + V0−(s = l)pi(s = l)
= [
h
2
+
x+ y
2
− I](
1
2
) + [
l
2
+
x+ y
2
− I](
1
2
)
= [
h+ l
4
+
x+ y
2
− I] (5)
It is easy to see that V0−(s = l) < V−1 < V0−(s = h). When s=h, the average market value
over the previous period will be lower than the current valuation. In this case, Equation 4 implies
that the issue price is equal to
V0−(s=h)
N
=
[h
2
+x+y
2
−I]
N
. Equation 4 implies that
fPA(s = h) =
I
N [h
2
+x+y
2
−I]
N
+ I
=
I
h
2
+ x+y
2
(6)
If s = l, Equation 4 implies that the issue price will be equal to the average price, which (after
using the result in Equation 5) is given by
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Pavg =
V0−(s = l) + V−1
2N
= (
1
2N
)(
l
2
+
x+ y
2
−I)+
1
2N
(
h+ l
4
+
x+ y
2
−I) =
[h+3l8 +
x+y
2 − I]
N
(7)
Using this issue price in Equation 2, the fraction of shares issued in a preferential allotment will
be given by
fPA(s = l) =
I
N [h+3l
8
+x+y
2
−I]
N
+ I
=
I
h+3l
8 +
x+y
2
(8)
In general, the fraction of shares “sold” in a preferential allotment is given by
fPA(s) =
I
h+3s
8 +
x+y
2
, s = l, h (9)
Note further that the SEBI-mandated issue price in a preferential allotment when s = l is over-
valued given the publicly available information. This overvaluation is given by the difference
between Vavg and V0−(s = l). Note that Vavg = NPavg, where Pavg follows from Equation 7.
Thus the SEBI regulations induced additional premium paid by buyers in a preferential allotment
is given by
Vavg − V0−(s = l) = [
h+ 3l
8
+
x+ y
2
− I]− [
l
2
+
x+ y
2
− I] =
(h− l)
8
(10)
A.1.4 Owner-managers’ investment-financing decision
At date τ = 0−, the owner-managers (promoter) observe a private signal (t) of the hidden value.
Let W (t, s) denote the expectation (as of date τ = 0) of the wealth of the owner-managers
(promoters) on the liquidation date τ= +1. Owner-managers have to choose among three al-
ternatives: (i) No issue (NI): no shares are issued if the project is rejected, (ii) Outside Equity
(OE): shares are issued to outsiders, and (iii) Preferential Allotment (PA): shares are issued to
owner-managers.
Case A (No Issue: NI)
The expected wealth of the owner-managers is given by the expected value of the assets-in-place
(AIP), expected hidden value (HV ), and the expected cash flows on the investment opportunity.
Since the project is not undertaken, its NPV is irrelevant in this alternative.
WNI(t, s) = α
(
s
2
+
t
2
)
(11)
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Case B (Outside Equity: OE)
The owner-managers issue a fraction, fOE, to outsiders and their expected wealth is given by the
expected value of the assets-in-place (AIP), expected hidden value (HV ), and the expected cash
flows on the investment opportunity. Once the fraction, fOE, of the firm is “sold”, the original
shareholders are left with the fraction, (1-fOE), of the firm. The owner-managers are entitled to
a fraction α of this remaining part. It follows that
WOE(t, s) = α(1 − fOE(s))
(
s
2
+
x+ y
2
+
t
2
)
(12)
Case C (Preferential allotment: PA)
The owner-managers issue a fraction, fPA(s), to themselves. In return for this additional share-
holding in the firm, the owner-managers have to supply the project’s investment capital of I.
Their original shareholding (α) entitles them to a fraction, α(1− fPA(s)), of the total expected
cash flows. In addition, they are also entitled to a fraction, fPA(s), of the firm’s expected
cash flows because of new shares issued to themselves in the preferential allotment. Finally, the
owner-managers supply the investment capital (I ) and this shows up as a negative cash flow:
WPA(t, s) =
[
α(1− fPA(s)) + fPA(s)
] [s
2
+
x+ y
2
+
t
2
]
− I (13)
As can be seen in Equations 11-13, the expected wealth depends on t, the private signal of the
hidden value observed by the owner-managers. We compare the three equations in a pair-wise
manner to determine the threshold cutoffs reported in Proposition 1.
To see the ordering in the cutoffs, note that t̂NI−PA(s) < t̂OE−PA(s) if and only ifNPV (IO) >=
(1−α) (h−s)
4
(x+y
2
)
s+x+y+ (h−s)
4
. It turns out that the condition required for t̂OE−PA(s) < t̂OE−NI(s) is also the
same. Thus, given the NPV condition in Proposition 1, it follows that t̂NI−PA(s) < t̂OE−PA(s) <
t̂OE−NI(s). Note that if the inequality constraint on NPV is reversed, the ordering of the thresh-
old cutoffs also gets reversed, i.e., t̂NI−PA(s) > t̂OE−PA(s) > t̂OE−NI(s). In this case, there
will be a range of values of t around t̂OE−PA(s) for which the owner-managers prefer the NI
alternative, leading to some underinvestment, as shown in Figure 5.
A.1.5 Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1(i) follows upon differentiating the expression for t̂OE−PA(s). Given that t is drawn
from a uniform distribution over (−H,H), it follows that the expectation of hidden value
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(HV ), conditional on a preferential allotment, is given by t̂
OE−PA(s)+H
4 . After substituting for
t̂OE−PA(s), we get an explicit expression for the announcement period effect stated in Equation
6. Corollary 1(iii) follows immediately upon differentiation of the announcement period return.
A.1.6 Manipulation Model
Manipulation in the model is captured by a spurious dip in price level at τ = 0− by an amount
equal to w. This dip in price is assumed to arise because of strategic trading by the owner-
managers in the period prior to the announcement date. Thus, prices at τ = 0− would reflect the
drop, w, in both the low price (s = l) and the high price (s = h) states of the world. The price
is given by V0−(s) =
s
2 +
x+y
2 − I − w. Due to price manipulation, owner-managers will now be
able to issue share to themselves at a lower price. Note that the expression for Equations 12-13
depend on fOE and fPA, as stated in Equations 3 and 9, respectively. These quantities change
because of the dip in price by the amount w, as shown below.
fOE(s) =
I
s
2 +
x+y
2 − w
(14)
fPA(s) =
I
h+3s
8 +
x+y
2 − w
(15)
With the above modifications in fPA(s) and fOE(s), the cutoffs in a world of manipulation are
determined in exactly the same way as before, namely, by comparing Equations 11-13 in a pair-
wise manner. Equations 8-10 follow from this comparison.
To demonstrate the nature of the optimization exercise in the context of our model, note that
manipulation prior to the announcement date is best captured by assuming that investments in
manipulation are made at τ = −1 and the benefits of manipulation are realized at τ = 0 when
the price level drops by an amount equal to w. At time τ = −1, owner-managers are unaware
of the realization of hidden value (t), which is revealed at time τ = 0−. Ex-ante, at τ = −1,
owner managers have to invest in manipulation activities without knowing the realization of t.
Ex-post, (at τ = 0−), they would have liked to have set w = 0 for low realizations of t (when
they would be issuing outside equity) and the maximum feasible value of w for sufficiently high
realizations of t (when they would be going for a preferential allotment). Given these ex-post
incentives, the ex-ante chosen value of w = w∗ would be some average of these two extreme
situations. It can be determined by integrating the benefits of manipulation over all possible
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realizations of t and then maximizing the expression with respect to w, shown in the equation
below. The tradeoffs in this optimization exercise are obvious: Choosing a very high value of
w would hurt owner-managers whenever they observe a low realization of the hidden value (t)
because it would trigger an outside equity issue at a less than favorable price. The low issue price
would benefit outsiders at the expense of insiders. On other hand, choosing a very low value of
w could also hurt if insiders observe a high realization of t because it would trigger a preferential
issue. Owner-managers would end up purchasing shares at higher prices than otherwise (i.e., if
they had invested more in manipulation activities). Choosing an intermediate level of w would
balance these tradeoffs (subject to the usual boundary conditions - in this case w < l in order to
ensure positive price levels.)
W (w∗) = Max[w]
{
Prob(s = h)
[∫ 0
−H
WOE(t, s = h;w)dt +
∫H
0 W
PA(t, s = h;w)dt
]
+ Prob(s = l)
[∫ t̂OE−PA(s=l)
−H
WOE(t, s = l;w)dt+
∫ H
t̂OE−PA(s=l)W
PA(t, s = l;w)dt
]}
(16)
A.1.7 Information Asymmetry in both Assets-in-place and Investment Opportu-
nity
We now consider the standard Myers and Majluf (1984) setup where information asymmetry
applies to both assets-in-place a well as the new project. Let the hidden value associated with
the NPV of the project be q, which is drawn from a distribution with an expected value of 0. We
assume that the manager will invest only in positive NPV projects. Equation 11 stays unchanged,
but Equations 12 and 13 get modified to the equations below:
WOE(t, s) = α(1− fOE(s))
[
s
2
+
x+ y
2
+
t
2
+
q
2
]
(17)
WPA(t, s) =
[
α(1 − fPA(s)) + fPA(s)
] [s
2
+
x+ y
2
+
t
2
+
q
2
]
− I (18)
Now, comparing Equation 17 with Equation 11 yields the following inequality, which has
to be satisfied for the owner-managers to prefer an outside equity financing choice (OE) to the
underinvestment choice (NI):
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q >
fOE(s)
1− fOE(s)
t+
[
fOE(s)
1− fOE(s)
s− (x+ y)
]
(19)
Note that the right hand side is a linear function of t with a positive slope and a negative
intercept term, as shown in the figure below. This linear boundary defines the regions of (q,
t) where the owner-managers prefer going for an outside equity issue (OE) rather than under-
investing in the project (NI) and vice versa.
Comparing Equation 11 with Equation 18, we can solve for the boundary that defines the
regions of (q, t) where the owner-managers prefer the preferential allotment choice (PA) to the
underinvestment choice (NI). The boundary is given by
q >
1
α+ fPA(s)(1− α)
(
−fPA(s)(1 − α)t+
[
2I − fPA(s)(1− α)s
])
− (x+ y) (20)
Again, the right hand side of Equation 20 is a linear function of t. However, both the slope
and the intercept term are negative, as shown in the figure below. In similar vein, we compare
Equation 17 with Equation 18 to determine the regions of (q, t) where preferential allotment
alternative (PA) is preferred to outside equity (OE). It can be shown that the boundary is
defined by
q > −t+
[
2I
α(fOE(s)− fPA(s)) + fPA(s)
− (s+ x+ y)
]
(21)
The right hand side of Inequality 21 is linear function of t. It has a slope of -1 and an intercept
term that is greater than 0 when s = l but exactly equal to 0 when s = h. We assume, as before,
that NPV (IO) >=
(1−α)
(h−s)
4
(x+y
2
)
s+x+y+
(h−s)
4
. This ensures that the threshold cutoff values are such that
t̂NI−PA(s) < t̂OE−PA(s) < t̂OE−NI(s). These cutoff values represent the intersection point of
the three lines with the x-axis.
Equations 19, 20 and 21 are mapped in the figure below. It is interesting to note that the
three equations have a common intersection point. A little bit of algebra can show that the
common intersection point has the coordinates, q∗ = t∗ = 2[I − (x + y)/2], which is negative
of twice the NPV of the project. Thus, the intersection point will always lie below the dashed
line (q = I − (x + y)/2), which defines the lower bound of the information asymmetry on the
NPV of the project. (The lower bound ensures that the manager considers only positive NPV
projects.) The underinvestment situation would arise only in the area spanned by the curved
arrow shown in the graph. In this region of (q,t), the manager would prefer the “No Issue”
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choice to both the preferential allotment and the outside equity alternatives. As can be seen in
the graph, the underinvestment region lies completely in the infeasible range of (q,t). It follows
that the manager will always accept all positive NPV projects (above a critical value, as stated
in Proposition 1) and there will be no underinvestment in such projects!
Figure A 1.1: Asymmetry of information and the firm’s financing decision
This figure shows how the regions of (q,t) – the combinations of information asymmetry about
the NPV of the project (q) and the information asymmetry about the assets-in-place (t) - affect
the financing decision. The feasible region of (q,t) lies above the dashed line parallel to (and
below) the x-axis. The underinvestment region lies in the infeasible range of (q,t). (To generate
the graph, we assume, x = 6, y = 4, I = 4, implying that the NPV = 1. Further, we assume
that H = 5, h = 10, l = 6, and = 0.25. )
A.1.8 Rights Offerings
In this section, we consider the implications of a rights offering, which is a financing arrange-
ment that raises capital on a pro rata basis from all existing shareholders. Thus, we expand the
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choice set for financing for the new investment, I, to Outside Equity (OE), Preferential Allot-
ment (PA), No Investment (NI) and Rights Offerings (RO). Following the same procedure as
in Appendix A.1.4, it can be seen that the wealth effect of a rights offering (for owner-managers)
is given by WRO(t, s) = α(1 − fRO(s))( s2 +
x+y
2 +
t
2) + αf
RO(s)( s2 +
x+y
2 +
t
2) − αI. The first
term represents the value of the residual claim of the owner-managers after the rights offering,
the second term represents the owner-managers’ gains from the present holdings from the rights
offering, and the third term represents the proportional investment made by owner-managers in
the rights offering. This expression simplifies to α( s2 +
x+y
2 +
t
2 )−αI. Note that the issue price in
the rights offering is irrelevant because the net wealth gain of owner-managers is independent of
fRO. Hence, the result holds even if the rights offering is at a discount to the current market value.
ComparingWRO(t, s) with the wealth effects from the other alternatives (OE, PA, and NI),
we can derive the cutoff levels of the signal t that defines the regions where one financing alterna-
tive is favored over the the other. For instance, comparing WRO(s) with WNI(t, s) = α
(
s
2 +
t
2
)
,
we get the result that the rights offering is always preferred to the “no investment alternative”
(for all signals of t) as long as the project has a positive NPV, 12(x + y)>I. Then, comparing
WRO(t, s) with WPA(t, s) =
[
α(1 − fPA(s)) + fPA(s)
] [
s
2 +
x+y
2 +
t
2
]
− I yields the result that
the preferential allotment alternative, PA, dominates the rights offering alternative, RO, for all
t > t¯(s) = h−s4 . Finally, comparingW
RO(t, s) withWOE(t, s) = α(1−fOE(s))
(
s
2 +
x+y
2 +
t
2
)
, we
can conclude that the rights offering alternative, RO, dominates the outside equity alternative,
OE, for signals t > 0, for positive NPV projects.
Given the above cutoffs for rights offerings compared with the other alternatives, and the
cutoffs between outside equity, preferential allotment and no investment alternatives determined
in the original analysis, we can see that outside equity dominates other alternatives for all t < 0,
rights offering dominates other alternatives for all t ∈ (0, h−s4 ), and preferential allotment domi-
nates other alternatives for all t > h−s4 .
This same result can be seen more intuitively using the opportunity cost approach developed
in the main text. A rights offering is like a combination of a preferential allotment and an outside
equity offering. When owner-managers observe a good signal (t > 0), the rights offering imposes
on them both an opportunity gain (they receive a fraction of the shares in a rights offering) as
well as a dilution loss (since the remaining fraction of shares is sold to outside equity holders
at a loss). If fRO(s) is the fraction of the firm sold in the rights offering, the opportunity gain
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of owner-managers as buyers is αfRO(s) t2 . As sellers, owner-managers face an opportunity loss
caused by dilution of αfRO(s) t2 . Thus, the net effect is zero. The opportunity gains/costs line
for the rights offering financing alternative would coincide with the x-axis in Figure 4, as is
shown below in a modified version in Figure A 1.2. It can be seen that a rights offering would
be preferred over a range of low values of the signal t. The range of t where the rights offering
alternative dominates is given by t ∈ (0, t¯), where, t¯ is the point where the opportunity cost line
for the preferential allotment alternative intersects the x-axis. Setting αfPA(s = l)[ t2 −
(h−l)
8 ], we
get t¯ = h−l4 or, in general, t¯(s) =
h−s
4 . Note that the rights offerings financing alternative dom-
inates the outside equity offering for all t ∈ (0, t̂OE−PA(s)) and also dominates the preferential
allotment alternative for all t ∈ (t̂OE−PA(s), h−14 ).
In summary, the key difference is that the preferential allotment alternative now is optimal for
all signals t > t¯ = h−l4 . Without rights offerings as a decision choice, the preferential allotment
alternative dominates for all signals t > t̂OE−PA(s). In both cases, the empirical implication
is that the preferential allotment alternative applies for all sufficiently good signals of t. More
importantly, as can be seen in the figure, the RO alternative always dominates the NI alterna-
tive, i,e., there will no under-investment as long as the project has a positive NPV. The NPV
condition in Proposition 1 is now NPV > 0 rather than a minimum lower bound.
Note that when s = h, t¯ = 0. In this case, the rights offering does not matter at all. The
preferential allotment alternative prevails for all t > 0 and the outside equity alternative prevails
for all t < 0. There is no role for rights offerings. This is the same result we obtained when
rights offerings were excluded. However, when s = l, rights offerings have a role because of the
SEBI-imposed additional financing cost on the preferential allotment alternative. This additional
financing costs tilts the balance in favor of the rights offering alternative for relatively low values
of the signal (t). Note that the average signal value over the range of t where the rights offering
alternative is preferred, is h−l8 , given that the unconditional distribution of t is uniform. This
average benefit is exactly equal to the SEBI-imposed costs on preferential allotment alternative.
For any signal t ∈ (0, t¯ = h−l4 ), the expected signal value is lower than the SEBI-imposed financ-
ing cost of h−l8 ; this is the reason why the rights offering dominates the preferential allotment
alternative over the range t ∈ (0, t¯ = h−l4 ).
Next, we verify that the above solution of rights offering is consistent with the backward
induction argument. We compute the expected value of the Hidden Value (HV ) conditional
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on the financing choice of the owner-managers as follows. Given that t arises from a uni-
form distribution over (−H,H), the market’s expectation of the Hidden Value (HV ) is equal
to (Prob(t < 0)(E(t|OE) + (Prob(t ∈ (0, t¯))E(t|RO) + (Prob(t > t¯)(E(t|PA). This implies that
the market expectation of t conditional on owner-mangers’ investment-financing policy is given
by: (H))2H
(−H)
2 +
t¯
2H
t¯
2 +
(H−t¯)
2H
(t¯+H)
2 = 0. Thus, in either case (s = h or s = l), the market’s
expectation of the Hidden Value (HV ) is equal to zero.
Corollary 1 is much more simplified in this new setup. First, as before, t¯(s = l) > t¯(s = h) = 0,
i.e., the cutoff that triggers the preferential allotment is higher when s = l. Second, the announce-
ment period effect is given by ∆P = t¯+H4 =
h−l
16 +
H
4 . It follows that the announcement period
reaction is increasing in H and h − l. These conclusions are exactly the same as in the case
where we ignored the rights offering alternative. However, the announcement period effect is
independent of α, the pre-financing ownership stake of the promoters. Also, the announcement
effect is independent of leverage in this case because an increase in debt leaves h− l unchanged
(See footnote 18).
To verify the robustness of the results to asymmetric information on the NPV of the project,
one can follow the same analysis as was conducted for the case where rights offerings are excluded.
Now we would have three lines defining dominance regions of RO versus NI, RO versus PA, and
RO versus OE. Note that the only line of relevance is the RO versus NI line. This line tells us
about (possibly new) regions where NI might dominate other alternatives. The other two lines
have no implications for underinvestment.
Recall that OE versus PA, PA versus NI, OE versus NI, discussed in the case where rights
offerings are excluded, intersect at a single point with q∗ = t∗ = −2NPV . It turns out that the
RO versus NI line is parallel to the x-axis and intersects the three lines at the same point! It
follows that the region where NI would dominate all other alternatives is exactly the same as in
the case where rights offerings were excluded. As argued earlier, this regions represents highly
infeasible range of asymmetric information - essentially, the information signal on NPV of the
projects should be worse than twice the NPV to face this situation. As before, if we impose a
reasonable constraint that the information signal on the NPV of the projects cannot be less than
-NPV, such a region where NI dominates all other alternatives will never arise.
To conclude, the key theoretical claim of the model that the preferential allotment alternative
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mitigates the underinvestment problem gets further strengthened in the presence of the rights
offering alternative (the few situations where underinvestment arises due to SEBI-imposed financ-
ing cost are eliminated). Equally important, the main empirical implications of the model survive
the inclusion of the rights offering alternative. The model predicts that preferential allotments
would have positive announcement effects and would be affected by the regulatory restrictions.
Figure A 1.2: Inclusion of Rights Offerings
Additional Premium due
to SEBI Regulations
(
h−l
8
)
t̂OE−PA(s = h)
Opportunity Gains(Costs)
t (Hidden Value)
Outside Equity (OE), s=l,h
Preferential Allotment (PA), s=h
Preferential Allotment (PA), s=l
Opportunity Cost = (1− α)fPA(s = h) t
2
Opportunity Cost = (1− α)fPA(s = l)[− (h−l)
8
+ t
2
]
t̂OE−PA(s = l)
Opportunity Cost = −αfOE(s = l) t
2
Rights Offerings
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics of Preferential Allotments of Equity in India
Firm Level Variables All firms Group Affiliated Stand-Alone Difference Low Price High Price Difference Owner-Manager Non Owner- Difference
firms firms (t-value) Path Path (t-value) Manager (t-value)
N 164 107 57 102 62 91 73
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Market Cap. (In Rupees Crore) 1956.35 2554.89 853 1701.89(3.00)*** 1758.69 2275.16 -516.47(-0.77) 2200 1646 554.66(0.77)
Illiquidity x 10−4(% Return/Rupee Volume) 6.18 3.52 11.10 -7.58(-3.70)*** 6.72 5.32 1.41(0.66) 7.33 5.19 2.14(1.03)
Volatility (%) 4.01 4.05 3.94 0.106(0.38) 4.18 3.74 0.44 (1.63) 4.07 3.97 0.099(0.36)
Interest coverage ratio 6.03 2.10 15.13 -13.02(-3.19)*** 7.26 3.99 3.26(0.22) 10.69 2.51 8.17(2.07)**
Debt-Equity ratio 0.93 1.01 0.78 0.22(0.48) 0.68 1.33 -0.648(-1.37) 0.47 1.13 -0.66(-1.46)
Panel B: Issue Characteristics
Issue size to Owner-Manager equity(%) 60.00 72.00 35.00 37.19(0.82) 77.90 31.45 46.44(1.07) 32.44 82.77 -50.00(-1.15)
Issue size to outstanding shares(%) 16.00 15.60 16.82 -1.21(-0.43) 17.25 14.01 3.24(1.18) 15.04 16.84 -1.80(-0.66)
Panel C: Investor Characteristics
Owner-Manager’s subscription(%) 45.00 43.00 50.80 -7.80(0.19) 59.70 40.30 19.40(-2.07)
Private Equity subscription(%) 44.70 49.50 35.20 14.30(2.10)** 65.00 35.00 30.00(0.30)
Bank subscription(%) 10.30 7.50 14.00 -6.50(-0.71) 66.67 35.33 33.34(1.34)
Panel D: Ownership Characteristics
Owner-Manager’s equity(%) 42.39 40.68 46.03 -5.35(-1.45) 42.83 41.70 1.13(0.32) 44.92 41.79 3.12(0.93)
This table reports the summary statistics relating to 164 firms that issued preferential allotments (private placements) of equity in India during
the years 2001-2009. The statistics for the full sample are reported in the first column. The other columns report statistics based on three sets of
sub-samples. The first set of sub-samples divides the sample based on whether a firm is affiliated to a business group (Group Affiliated firms) or not
(Stand-Alone firms). The second set of sub-samples divides the sample based on whether the issue was made following a low price path or high price
path. High Price Path (Low Price Path) represents the sub-sample of firms for which the average of high and low daily closing prices in the two-week
period prior to the announcement date is higher (lower) than the average of the weekly high and low average price in the six months prior to the
announcement date. The third set of sub-samples divides the total sample based on whether the owner-manager subscribed to the issue or not. The
statistics for each set of sub-samples are followed by their respective mean differences along with t-values in parentheses. Market Cap represents the
average market capitalization at the time of the issue. The amount is reported in crore of Indian Rupees. One US dollar is approximately 45 Indian
rupees and one crore is equal to 10 million. Illiquidity is the average ratio of daily absolute return to rupee volume for a period between 10 days to
240 days before the announcement date. Volatility is the (non-annualized) standard deviation of daily returns for a period between 10 days to 240
days before the announcement date. Interest coverage ratio is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expense. Debt-Equity ratio
is the ratio of total borrowing to net worth. All these variables are winsorized at the 1% level. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level respectively.
60
Table II: Announcement Effects of Preferential Allotments of Equity in India
Panel A: Overall Announcement Effects
All
CAR (-1,+1) (%) 0.87(1.73)
CAR (-5,+5) (%) 3.48(3.77)***
CAR (-10,+10) (%) 6.18(4.19)***
Panel B: Announcement Effect Based on the Formula Price
Low Price Path High Price Path Difference(t-value)
CAR (-1,+1) (%) 1.53(2.39)** -0.20(-0.25) -1.73(-1.69)
CAR (-5,+5) (%) 4.54(3.59)*** 1.79(1.40) -2.75(-1.53)
CAR (-10,+10) (%) 9.06(4.58)*** 1.58(0.77) -7.47(-2.62)**
Panel C: Announcement Effects based on the level of Volatility
Below Median Above Median Difference(t-value)
CAR (-1,+1) (%) 0.29(0.49) 1.88(2.2)** 1.60(1.50)
CAR (-5,+5) (%) 2.70(2.33)** 4.20(2.98)*** 1.50(0.83)
CAR (-10,+10) (%) 6.70(2.2)** 6.08(3.86)*** -0.61(-0.23)
Panel D: Announcement Effects based On Ownership level
Below Median Above Median Difference(t-value)
CAR (-1,+1) (%) 1.08(1.53) 0.63(0.87) -0.45(-0.44)
CAR (-5,+5) (%) 2.81(2.48)** 4.23(2.83)*** 1.42(0.76)
CAR (-10,+10) (%) 5.45(2.71)*** 7.0(3.21)*** 1.55(0.52)
Panel E: Announcement Effects based on the Interest Coverage Ratio
Below Median Above Median Difference(t-value)
CAR (-1,+1) (%) 0.80(0.69) 1.10(1.90) 0.30(1.50)
CAR (-5,+5) (%) 2.74(2.98)*** 3.92(2.33)** 1.18(0.64)
CAR (-10,+10) (%) 7.03(2.20)** 5.11(3.86)*** -1.92(-0.66)
Panel F: Announcement Effects based on the Issuer Type
Stand-Alone Firms Group Firms Difference(t-value)
CAR (-1,+1) (%) 1.90(2.2)** 0.30(0.49) -1.60(-1.50)
CAR (-5,+5) (%) 4.31(2.33)** 3.02(2.98)*** -1.29(-0.61)
CAR (-10,+10) (%) 10.87(3.86)*** 3.61(2.20)** -7.27(-2.23)**
Panel G: Announcement Effects based on the Investor Type
Owner- Private Equity Banks(B) (PE-OM) (B-OM) (B-PE)
Managers(OM) Firms(PE)
CAR (-1,+1) (%) 0.93(1.31) 0.49(0.65) 1.61(1.13) -0.44(-0.43) 0.68(0.43) 1.12(0.70)
CAR (-5,+5) (%) 4.20(3.29)*** 2.10(1.37) 3.24(1.35) -2.10(-1.05) -0.96(-0.35) 1.14(0.40)
CAR (-10,+10) (%) 7.82(3.71)*** 4.50(2.10)** 1.25(0.33) -3.30(-1.11) -6.58(-1.50) -3.25(-0.74)
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) around the announcement date for 164
private placements that occurred in India during 2001-2009. Abnormal returns are based on the market model (on
the BSE100 Index) over the period (-31,-240 ). CAR’s are calculated for three windows, namely, (-1 to +1), (-5
to +5), and (-10 to +10). Panel A presents the statistics for the full sample. Panel B reports the CAR’s based on
whether the preferential allotment follows a low price path or a high price path. High Price Path (Low Price Path)
represents the sub-sample of firms for which the average of high and low daily closing prices in the two-week period
prior to the announcement date is higher (lower) than the average of the weekly high and low average price in the
six months prior to the announcement date. Panel C reports results based on whether volatility, as measured by
the standard deviation of daily returns over the period (-10, -240), is above or below the sample median volatility.
Panel D reports results based on whether owner-managers’ ownership prior to the announcement is above or below
the sample median ownership level. Panel E reports results based on whether a firm’s interest coverage ratio is
above or below the sample median interest coverage ratio. Interest coverage ratio is the ratio of earnings before
interest and taxes to interest expense. Panel F reports results based on whether a firm is affiliated to a business
group (Group Affiliated firms) or not (Stand Alone firms). Panel G reports results based on whether the investor
is the owner-manager, or a bank or a private equity firm. Each panel has the corresponding mean differences along
with their t-values. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table III: Determinants of Announcements Effects of Preferential Allotments of Equity in
India
Variable Name Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Dependent Variable: CAR(-10,+10)
All firms All firms All firms Low Formula
Price firms
N 162 162 162 99
Intercept 19.81(3.21)*** 17.94(2.50)*** 17.95(2.49)*** 22.22 (2.43)***
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
ln(Market Cap) -2.11(-2.26)** -1.66(-1.61) -1.42(-1.34) -2.40(-1.71)
Group dummy -2.34(-0.75) -3.08(-0.97) -3.61(-1.10) -2.60(-0.61)
Volatility(%) 18.50(2.83)*** 18.36(2.76)*** 18.08(2.71)*** 27.80(3.12)***
Interest coverage ratio 0.009(0.41) 0.010(2.48)*** 0.001(2.35)** 0.020(3.35)***
Panel B: Issue Characteristics
Issue size to Owner-Manager equity (%) 0.001(0.23) 0.002(0.46) 0.003(0.53)
Issue size to outstanding shares (%) 0.080(0.96) 0.083(0.98) 0.196(1.46)
Instrument type dummy 1.301(0.38) 0.660(0.19) 0.212(0.04)
High Price Path dummy -5.65(-1.95)** -5.78(-1.99)**
Panel C: Investor Characteristics
Owner-Manager dummy − −
Private Equity dummy -1.87(-0.51) -8.64(-1.96)**
Banks dummy -4.81(-1.01) -8.92(-1.50)
Panel D: Ownership Characteristics
Owner-Manager’s Equity 0.00(0.06)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared(%) 13.01 14.49 13.95 27.04
p-value > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports regression results for 162 private placements in India during 2001-2009. The dependent variable
is the cumulative abnormal return for the -10 to +10 days window (CAR (-10, +10)) around the announcement
date. Abnormal returns are based on the market model (on the BSE100 Index) over the period (-31,-240 ). High
Price Path (Low Price Path) represents firms for which the average of high and low daily closing prices in the two-
week period prior to the announcement date is higher (lower) than the average of the weekly high and low average
price in the six months prior to the announcement date. Ln(Market cap) represents the natural log of market
capitalization of the firm. Group dummy takes the value 1 (0) if the firm is affiliated to an Indian business group
(Stand Alone firm). Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over the period (-10,-240 ).
Interest coverage ratio is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expense. Issue size
to Owner-Manager’s equity is the ratio of number of shares issued through preferential allotment divided by the
number of owner-manager shares. Issue size to outstanding shares refers to the number of shares issued through
preferential allotment to the number of outstanding shares. Instrument type dummy takes the value 1(0) if the
issue is made as plain equity (equity with warrants or convertibles). Private Equity dummy takes the value 1 if
the investor is a private equity firm, else it is 0. Bank dummy takes the value 1 if the buyer of the equity is a
bank, else it is 0. Owner-Manager’s equity represents the percentage of equity held by the owner-managers of the
firm. Year dummies are for years (one less) between 2001 to 2009. Industry dummies are based on 3-digit industry
codes. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table IV: Summary Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Return and Volume in Pre-Announcement Period
Panel A: Prior Period Abnormal Returns and Volume
Event Windows Mean t-value Median Event Windows Mean t-value Median
CAR (-22,-32) 5.13 1.35 2.66** CAV (-22,-32) 2783781 1.40 172445
CAR (-22,-154) 37.39 10.18*** 32.24 CAV (-22,-154) 2366700 2.25** 1323750
CAR (-22,-250) 52.01 14.02*** 47.17 CAV (-22,-250) 2468467 2.66 1108527
Panel B: Correlation Analysis
CAR(-22,-32) CAR(-22,-154) CAR(-22,-250) CAV(-22,-32) CAV(-22,-154) CAV(-22,-250)
CAR(-22,-32) 1
CAR(-22,-154) 0.3365 1
CAR(-22,-250) 0.2924 0.7451 1
CAV(-22,-32) 0.2369 0.1288 0.093 1
CAV(-22,-154) 0.0425 0.0742 0.1019 0.6623 1
CAV(-22,-250) 0.0072 0.0419 0.0962 0.5152 0.9721 1
This table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and Cumulative Abnormal Volume (CAV ) for a sample that comprises of 164 firms that
raised equity in India through preferential allotments during 2001-2009. Panel A reports the CAR and CAV for three specific windows before the
announcement date of the preferential allotments. In order to calculate the abnormal return, we estimate expected return using the market model
between 240 to 31 days before the announcement date. We use the BSE100 index as the benchmark for the Indian market return. Abnormal volume
is the difference between the actual volume and the expected volume of a given stock. Volume is measured as number of shares traded on a given
day. Expected volume is calculated by regressing daily stock volume on the daily market volume using four years’ daily data starting from day -300
going backwards. We use the top 1000 stocks of the Bombay Stock Exchange for calculating daily average market volume. The same procedure
is applied, however, for different windows for CAR(-22,-32),CAR(-22,-154), CAR(-22,-250), CAV(-22,-32), CAV(-22,-154)and CAV(-22,-250). We
report t-values and the median in the next two columns. Panel B reports correlations of the CAR’s and CAV’s for the three specific windows.***,
**, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table V: Determinants of Announcement Effects of Preferential Allotments of Equity in
India in the Presence of Manipulation
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Dependent Variable:CAR(-10,+10)
N 162 162 162 162 162
Intercept 27.02(2.71)*** 25.05(2.46)*** 22.63(1.95)** 27.51(2.73)*** 27.10(2.70)***
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
ln(Market cap) -0.12(-0.10) -0.37(-0.29) -0.35(-0.27) -0.12(-0.10) -0.10(-0.08)
Group dummy -6.67(-1.20) -6.74(-1.26) -5.94(-0.95) -6.82(-1.23) -6.71(-1.20)
Volatility 10.72(2.62)*** 12.28(2.87)*** 11.90(2.80)*** 10.55(2.59)*** 10.71(2.61)***
Interest coverage ratio 0.001(1.98)** 0.001(1.91)** 0.001(1.90)** 0.001(1.98)** 0.001(1.98)**
Panel B: Issue Characteristics
Issue size to Owner-Manager equity 0.003(0.56) 0.003(0.74) 0.002(0.42) 0.002(0.55) 0.002(0.55)
Issue size to outstanding shares 0.056(0.68) 0.027(0.34) 0.020(0.24) 0.057(0.70) 0.056(0.68)
Instrument type dummy 0.29(0.18) 0.48(1.25) 0.64(1.01) 0.37(1.20) 0.27(1.17)
High Price Path dummy -6.11(-2.15)** -6.75(-2.40)** -7.83(-2.62)*** -6.41(-2.20)** -6.27(-2.17)**
Panel C: Purchaser Characteristics
Owner-Manager dummy - - - - -
Private equity dummy -0.15(-0.05) -0.78(-0.25) -0.52(-0.16) -1.16(-0.05) -0.001(0.00)
Banks dummy -5.48(-1.19) -5.28(-1.17) -4.01(-0.86) -5.43(-1.18) -5.40(-1.17)
Panel D: Manipulation Environment
Ln(Illiquidity) -1.36(-2.14)** -1.37(-2.19)** -0.88(-1.99)** -1.39(-2.81)*** -1.35(-2.13)**
Panel E: Prior Period Abnormal Returns and Volume
CAR(-22,-32) 0.21(2.30)**
CAR(-22,-154) 0.006(1.73)*
CAV(-22,-32) 0.000(0.49)
CAV(-22,-154) 0.000(0.33)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared (%) 14.93 17.51 16.14 14.45 14.38
p-value>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports regression results for 162 private placements in India during 2001-2009. The dependent variable
is the cumulative abnormal return for the -10 to +10 days window (CAR (-10, +10)) around the announcement
date. Abnormal returns are based on the market model (on the BSE100 Index) over the period (-31,-240 ). High
Price Path (Low Price Path) represents firms for which the average of high and low daily closing prices in the two-
week period prior to the announcement date is higher (lower) than the average of the weekly high and low average
price in the six months prior to the announcement date. Ln(Market cap) represents the natural log of market
capitalization of the firm. Group dummy takes the value 1 (0) if the firm is affiliated to an Indian business group
(Stand Alone firm). Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over the period (-10,-240 ).
Interest coverage ratio is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expense. Issue size
to Owner-Manager’s equity is the ratio of number of shares issued through preferential allotment divided by the
number of owner-manager shares. Issue size to outstanding shares refers to the number of shares issued through
preferential allotment to the number of outstanding shares. Instrument type dummy takes the value 1(0) if the
issue is made as plain equity (equity with warrants or convertibles). Private Equity dummy takes the value 1 if the
investor is a private equity firm, else it is 0. Bank dummy takes the value 1 if the buyer of the equity is a bank,
else it is 0. Owner-Manager’s equity represents the percentage of equity held by the owner-managers of the firm.
Ln(Illiquidity) is the natural logarithm value of average ratio of daily absolute return to rupee volume over the
period -10,-240)). CAR(-22,-32),CAR(-22,-154), CAV(-22,-32), and CAV(-22,-154) are the cumulative abnormal
returns and cumulative abnormal volumes for the two-week and six-month windows prior to the announcement
date. Year dummies are for years (one less) between 2001 to 2009. Industry dummies are based on 3-digit industry
codes. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 7: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) based on price path dynamics. The sample
comprises of 164 firms that raised equity through preferential allotment during 2001-2009. In order to calculate the
abnormal return, we estimate expected return using market model between -240 to -31 days before the announce-
ment date. We use the BSE100 index as the benchmark for the Indian market return. The figure reports the
number of days before and after the announcement date on the x-axis and the percentage of cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR) on the y-axis. The figure has two graphs to represent CAARs for “low” versus “high”
issue prices. “High” price (“Low” Price) refers to those firms where the last two weeks average high and low daily
closing prices is higher (lower) than last six months weekly high and low average price.
Group Alaited Firms%
 StandAlone Firms%
All Firms
Figure 8: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) based on firm affiliation. The sample com-
prises of 164 firms that raised equity through preferential allotment during 2001-2009. In order to calculate the
abnormal return, we estimate expected return using market model between -240 to -31 days before the announce-
ment date. We use the BSE100 index as the benchmark for the Indian market return. The figure reports the
number of days before and after the announcement date on the x-axis and the percentage of cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR) on the y-axis. The figure has three graphs to represent CAARs for preferential allot-
ments made to all firms, Group Affiliated firms (Indian business groups) and Stand Alone firms.
65
Figure 9: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) based on purchaser type. The sample
comprises of 164 firms that raised equity through preferential allotment during 2001-2009. In order to calculate
the abnormal return, we estimate expected return using market model between -240 to -31 days before the an-
nouncement date. We use the BSE100 index as the benchmark for the Indian market return. The figure reports
the number of days before and after the announcement date on the x-axis and the percentage of cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR) on the y-axis. The figure has three graphs to represent CAARs for three types of buyers
of preferential equity, namely, promoters, banks, and private equity firms respectively.
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